Table of Contents for
Practical Malware Analysis

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical Malware Analysis by Andrew Honig Published by No Starch Press, 2012
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Malware Analysis: The Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software
  3. Praise for Practical Malware Analysis
  4. Warning
  5. About the Authors
  6. About the Technical Reviewer
  7. About the Contributing Authors
  8. Foreword
  9. Acknowledgments
  10. Individual Thanks
  11. Introduction
  12. What Is Malware Analysis?
  13. Prerequisites
  14. Practical, Hands-On Learning
  15. What’s in the Book?
  16. 0. Malware Analysis Primer
  17. The Goals of Malware Analysis
  18. Malware Analysis Techniques
  19. Types of Malware
  20. General Rules for Malware Analysis
  21. I. Basic Analysis
  22. 1. Basic Static Techniques
  23. Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step
  24. Hashing: A Fingerprint for Malware
  25. Finding Strings
  26. Packed and Obfuscated Malware
  27. Portable Executable File Format
  28. Linked Libraries and Functions
  29. Static Analysis in Practice
  30. The PE File Headers and Sections
  31. Conclusion
  32. Labs
  33. 2. Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines
  34. The Structure of a Virtual Machine
  35. Creating Your Malware Analysis Machine
  36. Using Your Malware Analysis Machine
  37. The Risks of Using VMware for Malware Analysis
  38. Record/Replay: Running Your Computer in Reverse
  39. Conclusion
  40. 3. Basic Dynamic Analysis
  41. Sandboxes: The Quick-and-Dirty Approach
  42. Running Malware
  43. Monitoring with Process Monitor
  44. Viewing Processes with Process Explorer
  45. Comparing Registry Snapshots with Regshot
  46. Faking a Network
  47. Packet Sniffing with Wireshark
  48. Using INetSim
  49. Basic Dynamic Tools in Practice
  50. Conclusion
  51. Labs
  52. II. Advanced Static Analysis
  53. 4. A Crash Course in x86 Disassembly
  54. Levels of Abstraction
  55. Reverse-Engineering
  56. The x86 Architecture
  57. Conclusion
  58. 5. IDA Pro
  59. Loading an Executable
  60. The IDA Pro Interface
  61. Using Cross-References
  62. Analyzing Functions
  63. Using Graphing Options
  64. Enhancing Disassembly
  65. Extending IDA with Plug-ins
  66. Conclusion
  67. Labs
  68. 6. Recognizing C Code Constructs in Assembly
  69. Global vs. Local Variables
  70. Disassembling Arithmetic Operations
  71. Recognizing if Statements
  72. Recognizing Loops
  73. Understanding Function Call Conventions
  74. Analyzing switch Statements
  75. Disassembling Arrays
  76. Identifying Structs
  77. Analyzing Linked List Traversal
  78. Conclusion
  79. Labs
  80. 7. Analyzing Malicious Windows Programs
  81. The Windows API
  82. The Windows Registry
  83. Networking APIs
  84. Following Running Malware
  85. Kernel vs. User Mode
  86. The Native API
  87. Conclusion
  88. Labs
  89. III. Advanced Dynamic Analysis
  90. 8. Debugging
  91. Source-Level vs. Assembly-Level Debuggers
  92. Kernel vs. User-Mode Debugging
  93. Using a Debugger
  94. Exceptions
  95. Modifying Execution with a Debugger
  96. Modifying Program Execution in Practice
  97. Conclusion
  98. 9. OllyDbg
  99. Loading Malware
  100. The OllyDbg Interface
  101. Memory Map
  102. Viewing Threads and Stacks
  103. Executing Code
  104. Breakpoints
  105. Loading DLLs
  106. Tracing
  107. Exception Handling
  108. Patching
  109. Analyzing Shellcode
  110. Assistance Features
  111. Plug-ins
  112. Scriptable Debugging
  113. Conclusion
  114. Labs
  115. 10. Kernel Debugging with WinDbg
  116. Drivers and Kernel Code
  117. Setting Up Kernel Debugging
  118. Using WinDbg
  119. Microsoft Symbols
  120. Kernel Debugging in Practice
  121. Rootkits
  122. Loading Drivers
  123. Kernel Issues for Windows Vista, Windows 7, and x64 Versions
  124. Conclusion
  125. Labs
  126. IV. Malware Functionality
  127. 11. Malware Behavior
  128. Downloaders and Launchers
  129. Backdoors
  130. Credential Stealers
  131. Persistence Mechanisms
  132. Privilege Escalation
  133. Covering Its Tracks—User-Mode Rootkits
  134. Conclusion
  135. Labs
  136. 12. Covert Malware Launching
  137. Launchers
  138. Process Injection
  139. Process Replacement
  140. Hook Injection
  141. Detours
  142. APC Injection
  143. Conclusion
  144. Labs
  145. 13. Data Encoding
  146. The Goal of Analyzing Encoding Algorithms
  147. Simple Ciphers
  148. Common Cryptographic Algorithms
  149. Custom Encoding
  150. Decoding
  151. Conclusion
  152. Labs
  153. 14. Malware-Focused Network Signatures
  154. Network Countermeasures
  155. Safely Investigate an Attacker Online
  156. Content-Based Network Countermeasures
  157. Combining Dynamic and Static Analysis Techniques
  158. Understanding the Attacker’s Perspective
  159. Conclusion
  160. Labs
  161. V. Anti-Reverse-Engineering
  162. 15. Anti-Disassembly
  163. Understanding Anti-Disassembly
  164. Defeating Disassembly Algorithms
  165. Anti-Disassembly Techniques
  166. Obscuring Flow Control
  167. Thwarting Stack-Frame Analysis
  168. Conclusion
  169. Labs
  170. 16. Anti-Debugging
  171. Windows Debugger Detection
  172. Identifying Debugger Behavior
  173. Interfering with Debugger Functionality
  174. Debugger Vulnerabilities
  175. Conclusion
  176. Labs
  177. 17. Anti-Virtual Machine Techniques
  178. VMware Artifacts
  179. Vulnerable Instructions
  180. Tweaking Settings
  181. Escaping the Virtual Machine
  182. Conclusion
  183. Labs
  184. 18. Packers and Unpacking
  185. Packer Anatomy
  186. Identifying Packed Programs
  187. Unpacking Options
  188. Automated Unpacking
  189. Manual Unpacking
  190. Tips and Tricks for Common Packers
  191. Analyzing Without Fully Unpacking
  192. Packed DLLs
  193. Conclusion
  194. Labs
  195. VI. Special Topics
  196. 19. Shellcode Analysis
  197. Loading Shellcode for Analysis
  198. Position-Independent Code
  199. Identifying Execution Location
  200. Manual Symbol Resolution
  201. A Full Hello World Example
  202. Shellcode Encodings
  203. NOP Sleds
  204. Finding Shellcode
  205. Conclusion
  206. Labs
  207. 20. C++ Analysis
  208. Object-Oriented Programming
  209. Virtual vs. Nonvirtual Functions
  210. Creating and Destroying Objects
  211. Conclusion
  212. Labs
  213. 21. 64-Bit Malware
  214. Why 64-Bit Malware?
  215. Differences in x64 Architecture
  216. Windows 32-Bit on Windows 64-Bit
  217. 64-Bit Hints at Malware Functionality
  218. Conclusion
  219. Labs
  220. A. Important Windows Functions
  221. B. Tools for Malware Analysis
  222. C. Solutions to Labs
  223. Lab 1-1 Solutions
  224. Lab 1-2 Solutions
  225. Lab 1-3 Solutions
  226. Lab 1-4 Solutions
  227. Lab 3-1 Solutions
  228. Lab 3-2 Solutions
  229. Lab 3-3 Solutions
  230. Lab 3-4 Solutions
  231. Lab 5-1 Solutions
  232. Lab 6-1 Solutions
  233. Lab 6-2 Solutions
  234. Lab 6-3 Solutions
  235. Lab 6-4 Solutions
  236. Lab 7-1 Solutions
  237. Lab 7-2 Solutions
  238. Lab 7-3 Solutions
  239. Lab 9-1 Solutions
  240. Lab 9-2 Solutions
  241. Lab 9-3 Solutions
  242. Lab 10-1 Solutions
  243. Lab 10-2 Solutions
  244. Lab 10-3 Solutions
  245. Lab 11-1 Solutions
  246. Lab 11-2 Solutions
  247. Lab 11-3 Solutions
  248. Lab 12-1 Solutions
  249. Lab 12-2 Solutions
  250. Lab 12-3 Solutions
  251. Lab 12-4 Solutions
  252. Lab 13-1 Solutions
  253. Lab 13-2 Solutions
  254. Lab 13-3 Solutions
  255. Lab 14-1 Solutions
  256. Lab 14-2 Solutions
  257. Lab 14-3 Solutions
  258. Lab 15-1 Solutions
  259. Lab 15-2 Solutions
  260. Lab 15-3 Solutions
  261. Lab 16-1 Solutions
  262. Lab 16-2 Solutions
  263. Lab 16-3 Solutions
  264. Lab 17-1 Solutions
  265. Lab 17-2 Solutions
  266. Lab 17-3 Solutions
  267. Lab 18-1 Solutions
  268. Lab 18-2 Solutions
  269. Lab 18-3 Solutions
  270. Lab 18-4 Solutions
  271. Lab 18-5 Solutions
  272. Lab 19-1 Solutions
  273. Lab 19-2 Solutions
  274. Lab 19-3 Solutions
  275. Lab 20-1 Solutions
  276. Lab 20-2 Solutions
  277. Lab 20-3 Solutions
  278. Lab 21-1 Solutions
  279. Lab 21-2 Solutions
  280. Index
  281. Index
  282. Index
  283. Index
  284. Index
  285. Index
  286. Index
  287. Index
  288. Index
  289. Index
  290. Index
  291. Index
  292. Index
  293. Index
  294. Index
  295. Index
  296. Index
  297. Index
  298. Index
  299. Index
  300. Index
  301. Index
  302. Index
  303. Index
  304. Index
  305. Index
  306. Index
  307. Updates
  308. About the Authors
  309. Copyright

Object-Oriented Programming

Unlike C, C++ is an object-oriented programming language, following a programming model that uses objects that contain data as well as functions to manipulate the data. The functions in object-oriented programming are like functions in C programs, except that they are associated with a particular object or class of objects. Functions within a C++ class are often called methods to draw a distinction. Although many features of object-oriented programming are irrelevant to malware analysis because they do not impact the assembly, a few can complicate analysis.

Note

To learn more about C++, consider reading Thinking in C++ by Bruce Eckel, available as a free download from http://www.mindviewinc.com/.

In object-orientation, code is arranged in user-defined data types called classes. Classes are like structs, except that they store function information in addition to data. Classes are like a blueprint for creating an object—one that specifies the functions and data layout for an object in memory.

When executing object-oriented C++ code, you use the class to create an object of the class. This object is referred to as an instance of the class. You can have multiple instances of the same class. Each instance of a class has its own data, but all objects of the same type share the same functions. To access data or call a function, you must reference an object of that type.

Example 20-1 shows a simple C++ program with a class and a single object.

Example 20-1. A simple C++ class

class SimpleClass {
public:
      int x;
      void HelloWorld() {
            printf("Hello World\n");
      }
};

int _tmain(int argc, _TCHAR* argv[])
{
      SimpleClass myObject;
      myObject.HelloWorld();
}

In this example, the class is called SimpleClass. It has one data element, x, and a single function, HelloWorld. We create an instance of SimpleClass named myObject and call the HelloWorld function for that object. (The public keyword is a compiler-enforced abstraction mechanism with no impact on the assembly code.)

The this Pointer

As we have established, data and functions are associated with objects. In order to access a piece of data, you use the form ObjectName.variableName. Functions are called similarly with ObjectName.functionName. For example, in Example 20-1, if we wanted to access the x variable, we would use myObject.x.

In addition to accessing variables using the object name and the variable name, you can also access variables for the current object using only the variable name. Example 20-2 shows an example.

Example 20-2. A C++ example with the this pointer

class SimpleClass {
public:
      int x;
      void HelloWorld() {
            if (x == 10) printf("X is 10.\n");
      }
      ...
};

int _tmain(int argc, _TCHAR* argv[])
{
      SimpleClass myObject;
     myObject.x = 9;
     myObject.HelloWorld();
      SimpleClass myOtherObject;
      myOtherOject.x = 10;
      myOtherObject.HelloWorld();
}

In the HelloWorld function, the variable x is accessed as just x at , and not ObjectName.x. That same variable, which refers to the same address in memory, is accessed in the main method at using myObject.x.

Within the HelloWorld method, the variable can be accessed just as x because it is assumed to refer to the object that was used to call the function, which in the first case is myObject . Depending on which object is used to call the HelloWorld function, a different memory address storing the x variable will be accessed. For example, if the function were called with myOtherObject.HelloWorld, then an x reference at would access a different memory location than when that is called with myObject.HelloWorld. The this pointer is used to keep track of which memory address to access when accessing the x variable.

The this pointer is implied in every variable access within a function that doesn’t specify an object; it is an implied parameter to every object function call. Within Microsoft-generated assembly code, the this parameter is usually passed in the ECX register, although sometimes ESI is used instead.

In Chapter 6, we covered the stdcall, cdecl, and fastcall calling conventions. The C++ calling convention for the this pointer is often called thiscall. Identifying the thiscall convention can be one easy way to identify object-oriented code when looking at disassembly.

The assembly in Example 20-3, generated from Example 20-2, demonstrates the usage of the this pointer.

Example 20-3. The this pointer shown in disassembly

;Main Function
00401100                 push    ebp
00401101                 mov     ebp, esp
00401103                 sub     esp, 1F0h
00401109                mov     [ebp+var_10], offset off_404768
00401110                mov     [ebp+var_C], 9
00401117                lea     ecx, [ebp+var_10]
0040111A                 call    sub_4115D0
0040111F                 mov     [ebp+var_34], offset off_404768
00401126                 mov     [ebp+var_30], 0Ah
0040112D                 lea     ecx, [ebp+var_34]
00401130                 call    sub_4115D0

;HelloWorld Function
004115D0                 push    ebp
004115D1                 mov     ebp, esp
004115D3                 sub     esp, 9Ch
004115D9                 push    ebx
004115DA                 push    esi
004115DB                 push    edi
004115DC                 mov    [ebp+var_4], ecx
004115DF                 mov    eax, [ebp+var_4]
004115E2                 cmp     dword ptr [eax+4], 0Ah
004115E6                 jnz     short loc_4115F6
004115E8                 push    offset aXIs10_  ; "X is 10.\n"
004115ED                 call    ds:__imp__printf

The main method first allocates space on the stack. The beginning of the object is stored at var_10 on the stack at . The first data value stored in that object is the variable x, which is set at an offset of 4 from the beginning of the object. The value x is accessed at and is labeled var_C by IDA Pro. IDA Pro can’t determine whether the values are both part of the same object, and it labels x as a separate value. The pointer to the object is then placed into ECX for the function call . Within the HelloWorld function, the value of ECX is retrieved and used as the this pointer . Then at an offset of 4, the code accesses the value for x . When the main function calls HelloWorld for the second time, it loads a different pointer into ECX.

Overloading and Mangling

C++ supports a coding construct known as method overloading, which is the ability to have multiple functions with the same name, but that accept different parameters. When the function is called, the compiler determines which version of the function to use based on the number and types of parameters used in the call, as shown in Example 20-4.

Example 20-4. Function overloading example

LoadFile (String filename) {
...
}
LoadFile (String filename, int Options) {
...
}

Main () {
      LoadFile ("c:\myfile.txt"); //Calls the first LoadFile function
      LoadFile ("c:\myfile.txt", GENERIC_READ); //Calls the second LoadFile
}

As you can see in the listing, there are two LoadFile functions: one that takes only a string and another that takes a string and an integer. When the LoadFile function is called within the main method, the compiler selects the function to call based on the number of parameters supplied.

C++ uses a technique called name mangling to support method overloading. In the PE file format, each function is labeled with only its name, and the function parameters are not specified in the compiled binary format.

To support overloading, the names in the file format are modified so that the name information includes the parameter information. For example, if a function called TestFunction is part of the SimpleClass class and accepts two integers as parameters, the mangled name of that function would be ?TestFunction@SimpleClass@@QAEXHH@Z.

The algorithm for mangling the names is compiler-specific, but IDA Pro can demangle the names for most compilers. For example, Figure 20-1 shows the function TestFunction. IDA Pro demangles the function and shows the original name and parameters.

IDA Pro listing of a demangled function name

Figure 20-1. IDA Pro listing of a demangled function name

The internal function names are visible only if there are symbols in the code you are analyzing. Malware usually has the internal symbols removed; however, some imported or exported C++ functions with mangled names may be visible in IDA Pro.

Inheritance and Function Overriding

Inheritance is an object-oriented programming concept in which parent-child relationships are established between classes. Child classes inherit functions and data from parent classes. A child class automatically has all the functions and data of the parent class, and usually defines additional functions and data. For example, Example 20-5 shows a class called Socket.

Example 20-5. Inheritance example

class Socket {
...
public:
      void setDestinationAddr (INetAddr * addr) {
      ...
      }
      ...
};

class UDPSocket : publicSocket {
public:
     void sendData (char * buf, INetAddr * addr) {
         setDestinationAddr(addr)
          ...
      }
      ...
};

The Socket class has a function to set the destination address, but it has no function to sendData because it’s not a specific type of socket. A child class called UDPSocket can send data and implements the sendData function at , and it can also call the setDestinationAddr function defined in the Socket class.

In Example 20-5, the sendData function at can call the setDestinationAddr function at even though that function is not defined in the UDPSocket class, because the functionality of the parent class is automatically included in the child class.

Inheritance helps programmers more efficiently reuse code, but it’s a feature that does not require any runtime data structures and generally isn’t visible in assembly code.