Table of Contents for
Practical Malware Analysis

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical Malware Analysis by Andrew Honig Published by No Starch Press, 2012
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Malware Analysis: The Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software
  3. Praise for Practical Malware Analysis
  4. Warning
  5. About the Authors
  6. About the Technical Reviewer
  7. About the Contributing Authors
  8. Foreword
  9. Acknowledgments
  10. Individual Thanks
  11. Introduction
  12. What Is Malware Analysis?
  13. Prerequisites
  14. Practical, Hands-On Learning
  15. What’s in the Book?
  16. 0. Malware Analysis Primer
  17. The Goals of Malware Analysis
  18. Malware Analysis Techniques
  19. Types of Malware
  20. General Rules for Malware Analysis
  21. I. Basic Analysis
  22. 1. Basic Static Techniques
  23. Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step
  24. Hashing: A Fingerprint for Malware
  25. Finding Strings
  26. Packed and Obfuscated Malware
  27. Portable Executable File Format
  28. Linked Libraries and Functions
  29. Static Analysis in Practice
  30. The PE File Headers and Sections
  31. Conclusion
  32. Labs
  33. 2. Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines
  34. The Structure of a Virtual Machine
  35. Creating Your Malware Analysis Machine
  36. Using Your Malware Analysis Machine
  37. The Risks of Using VMware for Malware Analysis
  38. Record/Replay: Running Your Computer in Reverse
  39. Conclusion
  40. 3. Basic Dynamic Analysis
  41. Sandboxes: The Quick-and-Dirty Approach
  42. Running Malware
  43. Monitoring with Process Monitor
  44. Viewing Processes with Process Explorer
  45. Comparing Registry Snapshots with Regshot
  46. Faking a Network
  47. Packet Sniffing with Wireshark
  48. Using INetSim
  49. Basic Dynamic Tools in Practice
  50. Conclusion
  51. Labs
  52. II. Advanced Static Analysis
  53. 4. A Crash Course in x86 Disassembly
  54. Levels of Abstraction
  55. Reverse-Engineering
  56. The x86 Architecture
  57. Conclusion
  58. 5. IDA Pro
  59. Loading an Executable
  60. The IDA Pro Interface
  61. Using Cross-References
  62. Analyzing Functions
  63. Using Graphing Options
  64. Enhancing Disassembly
  65. Extending IDA with Plug-ins
  66. Conclusion
  67. Labs
  68. 6. Recognizing C Code Constructs in Assembly
  69. Global vs. Local Variables
  70. Disassembling Arithmetic Operations
  71. Recognizing if Statements
  72. Recognizing Loops
  73. Understanding Function Call Conventions
  74. Analyzing switch Statements
  75. Disassembling Arrays
  76. Identifying Structs
  77. Analyzing Linked List Traversal
  78. Conclusion
  79. Labs
  80. 7. Analyzing Malicious Windows Programs
  81. The Windows API
  82. The Windows Registry
  83. Networking APIs
  84. Following Running Malware
  85. Kernel vs. User Mode
  86. The Native API
  87. Conclusion
  88. Labs
  89. III. Advanced Dynamic Analysis
  90. 8. Debugging
  91. Source-Level vs. Assembly-Level Debuggers
  92. Kernel vs. User-Mode Debugging
  93. Using a Debugger
  94. Exceptions
  95. Modifying Execution with a Debugger
  96. Modifying Program Execution in Practice
  97. Conclusion
  98. 9. OllyDbg
  99. Loading Malware
  100. The OllyDbg Interface
  101. Memory Map
  102. Viewing Threads and Stacks
  103. Executing Code
  104. Breakpoints
  105. Loading DLLs
  106. Tracing
  107. Exception Handling
  108. Patching
  109. Analyzing Shellcode
  110. Assistance Features
  111. Plug-ins
  112. Scriptable Debugging
  113. Conclusion
  114. Labs
  115. 10. Kernel Debugging with WinDbg
  116. Drivers and Kernel Code
  117. Setting Up Kernel Debugging
  118. Using WinDbg
  119. Microsoft Symbols
  120. Kernel Debugging in Practice
  121. Rootkits
  122. Loading Drivers
  123. Kernel Issues for Windows Vista, Windows 7, and x64 Versions
  124. Conclusion
  125. Labs
  126. IV. Malware Functionality
  127. 11. Malware Behavior
  128. Downloaders and Launchers
  129. Backdoors
  130. Credential Stealers
  131. Persistence Mechanisms
  132. Privilege Escalation
  133. Covering Its Tracks—User-Mode Rootkits
  134. Conclusion
  135. Labs
  136. 12. Covert Malware Launching
  137. Launchers
  138. Process Injection
  139. Process Replacement
  140. Hook Injection
  141. Detours
  142. APC Injection
  143. Conclusion
  144. Labs
  145. 13. Data Encoding
  146. The Goal of Analyzing Encoding Algorithms
  147. Simple Ciphers
  148. Common Cryptographic Algorithms
  149. Custom Encoding
  150. Decoding
  151. Conclusion
  152. Labs
  153. 14. Malware-Focused Network Signatures
  154. Network Countermeasures
  155. Safely Investigate an Attacker Online
  156. Content-Based Network Countermeasures
  157. Combining Dynamic and Static Analysis Techniques
  158. Understanding the Attacker’s Perspective
  159. Conclusion
  160. Labs
  161. V. Anti-Reverse-Engineering
  162. 15. Anti-Disassembly
  163. Understanding Anti-Disassembly
  164. Defeating Disassembly Algorithms
  165. Anti-Disassembly Techniques
  166. Obscuring Flow Control
  167. Thwarting Stack-Frame Analysis
  168. Conclusion
  169. Labs
  170. 16. Anti-Debugging
  171. Windows Debugger Detection
  172. Identifying Debugger Behavior
  173. Interfering with Debugger Functionality
  174. Debugger Vulnerabilities
  175. Conclusion
  176. Labs
  177. 17. Anti-Virtual Machine Techniques
  178. VMware Artifacts
  179. Vulnerable Instructions
  180. Tweaking Settings
  181. Escaping the Virtual Machine
  182. Conclusion
  183. Labs
  184. 18. Packers and Unpacking
  185. Packer Anatomy
  186. Identifying Packed Programs
  187. Unpacking Options
  188. Automated Unpacking
  189. Manual Unpacking
  190. Tips and Tricks for Common Packers
  191. Analyzing Without Fully Unpacking
  192. Packed DLLs
  193. Conclusion
  194. Labs
  195. VI. Special Topics
  196. 19. Shellcode Analysis
  197. Loading Shellcode for Analysis
  198. Position-Independent Code
  199. Identifying Execution Location
  200. Manual Symbol Resolution
  201. A Full Hello World Example
  202. Shellcode Encodings
  203. NOP Sleds
  204. Finding Shellcode
  205. Conclusion
  206. Labs
  207. 20. C++ Analysis
  208. Object-Oriented Programming
  209. Virtual vs. Nonvirtual Functions
  210. Creating and Destroying Objects
  211. Conclusion
  212. Labs
  213. 21. 64-Bit Malware
  214. Why 64-Bit Malware?
  215. Differences in x64 Architecture
  216. Windows 32-Bit on Windows 64-Bit
  217. 64-Bit Hints at Malware Functionality
  218. Conclusion
  219. Labs
  220. A. Important Windows Functions
  221. B. Tools for Malware Analysis
  222. C. Solutions to Labs
  223. Lab 1-1 Solutions
  224. Lab 1-2 Solutions
  225. Lab 1-3 Solutions
  226. Lab 1-4 Solutions
  227. Lab 3-1 Solutions
  228. Lab 3-2 Solutions
  229. Lab 3-3 Solutions
  230. Lab 3-4 Solutions
  231. Lab 5-1 Solutions
  232. Lab 6-1 Solutions
  233. Lab 6-2 Solutions
  234. Lab 6-3 Solutions
  235. Lab 6-4 Solutions
  236. Lab 7-1 Solutions
  237. Lab 7-2 Solutions
  238. Lab 7-3 Solutions
  239. Lab 9-1 Solutions
  240. Lab 9-2 Solutions
  241. Lab 9-3 Solutions
  242. Lab 10-1 Solutions
  243. Lab 10-2 Solutions
  244. Lab 10-3 Solutions
  245. Lab 11-1 Solutions
  246. Lab 11-2 Solutions
  247. Lab 11-3 Solutions
  248. Lab 12-1 Solutions
  249. Lab 12-2 Solutions
  250. Lab 12-3 Solutions
  251. Lab 12-4 Solutions
  252. Lab 13-1 Solutions
  253. Lab 13-2 Solutions
  254. Lab 13-3 Solutions
  255. Lab 14-1 Solutions
  256. Lab 14-2 Solutions
  257. Lab 14-3 Solutions
  258. Lab 15-1 Solutions
  259. Lab 15-2 Solutions
  260. Lab 15-3 Solutions
  261. Lab 16-1 Solutions
  262. Lab 16-2 Solutions
  263. Lab 16-3 Solutions
  264. Lab 17-1 Solutions
  265. Lab 17-2 Solutions
  266. Lab 17-3 Solutions
  267. Lab 18-1 Solutions
  268. Lab 18-2 Solutions
  269. Lab 18-3 Solutions
  270. Lab 18-4 Solutions
  271. Lab 18-5 Solutions
  272. Lab 19-1 Solutions
  273. Lab 19-2 Solutions
  274. Lab 19-3 Solutions
  275. Lab 20-1 Solutions
  276. Lab 20-2 Solutions
  277. Lab 20-3 Solutions
  278. Lab 21-1 Solutions
  279. Lab 21-2 Solutions
  280. Index
  281. Index
  282. Index
  283. Index
  284. Index
  285. Index
  286. Index
  287. Index
  288. Index
  289. Index
  290. Index
  291. Index
  292. Index
  293. Index
  294. Index
  295. Index
  296. Index
  297. Index
  298. Index
  299. Index
  300. Index
  301. Index
  302. Index
  303. Index
  304. Index
  305. Index
  306. Index
  307. Updates
  308. About the Authors
  309. Copyright

Identifying Execution Location

Shellcode needs to dereference a base pointer when accessing data in a position-independent manner. Adding or subtracting values to this base value will allow it to safely access data that is included with the shellcode. Because the x86 instruction set does not provide EIP-relative data access, as it does for control-flow instructions, a general-purpose register must first be loaded with the current instruction pointer, to be used as the base pointer.

Obtaining the current instruction pointer may not be immediately obvious, because the instruction pointer on x86 systems cannot be directly accessed by software. In fact, there is no way to assemble the instruction mov eax, eip to directly load a general-purpose register with the current instruction pointer. However, shellcode uses two popular techniques to address this issue: call/pop and fnstenv instructions.

Using call/pop

When a call instruction is executed, the processor pushes the address of the instruction following the call onto the stack, and then branches to the requested location. This function executes, and when it completes, it executes a ret instruction to pop the return address off the top of the stack and load it into the instruction pointer. As a result, execution returns to the instruction just after the call.

Shellcode can abuse this convention by immediately executing a pop instruction after a call, which will load the address immediately following the call into the specified register. Example 19-1 shows a simple Hello World example that uses this technique.

Example 19-1. call/pop Hello World example

Bytes            Disassembly
83 EC 20         sub     esp, 20h
31 D2            xor     edx, edx
E8 0D 00 00 00   call    sub_17 
48 65 6C 6C 6F   db 'Hello World!',0 
20 57 6F 72 6C
64 21 00

sub_17:
5F               pop     edi             ; edi gets string pointer
52               push    edx               ; uType: MB_OK
57               push    edi               ; lpCaption
57               push    edi               ; lpText
52               push    edx               ; hWnd: NULL
B8 EA 07 45 7E   mov     eax, 7E4507EAh    ; MessageBoxA
FF D0            call    eax 
52               push    edx               ; uExitCode
B8 FA CA 81 7C   mov     eax, 7C81CAFAh    ; ExitProcess
FF D0            call    eax 

The call at transfers control to sub_17 at . This is PIC because the call instruction uses an EIP relative value (0x0000000D) to calculate the call target. The pop instruction at loads the address stored on top of the stack into EDI.

Remember that the EIP value saved by the call instruction points to the location immediately following the call, so after the pop instruction, EDI will contain a pointer to the db declaration at . This db declaration is assembly language syntax to create a sequence of bytes to spell out the string Hello World!. After the pop at , EDI will point to this Hello World! string.

This method of intermingling code and data is normal for shellcode, but it can easily confuse disassemblers who try to interpret the data following the call instruction as code, resulting in either nonsensical disassembly or completely halting the disassembly process if invalid opcode combinations are encountered. As seen in Chapter 15, using call/pop pairs to obtain pointers to data may be incorporated into larger programs as an additional anti-reverse-engineering technique.

The remaining code calls MessageBoxA to show the “Hello World!” message, and then ExitProcess to cleanly exit. This sample uses hard-coded locations for both function calls because imported functions in shellcode are not automatically resolved by the loader, but hard-coded locations make this code fragile. (These addresses come from a Windows XP SP3 box, and may differ from yours.)

To find these function addresses with OllyDbg, open any process and press CTRL-G to bring up the Enter Expression to Follow dialog. Enter MessageBoxA in the dialog and press ENTER. The debugger should show the location of the function, as long as the library with this export (user32.dll) is loaded by the process being debugged.

To load and step through this example with shellcode_launcher.exe, enter the following at the command line:

shellcode_launcher.exe -i helloworld.bin -bp -L user32

The -L user32 option is required because the shellcode does not call LoadLibraryA, so shellcode_launcher.exe must make sure this library is loaded. The -bp option inserts a breakpoint instruction just prior to jumping to the shellcode binary specified with the -i option. Recall that debuggers can be registered for just-in-time debugging and can be launched automatically (or when prompted) when a program encounters a breakpoint. If a debugger such as OllyDbg has been registered as a just-in-time debugger, it will open and attach to the process that encountered a breakpoint. This allows you to skip over the contents of the shellcode_launcher.exe program and begin at the start of the shellcode binary.

You can set OllyDbg as your just-in-time debugger by selecting OptionsJust-in-time DebuggingMake OllyDbg Just-in-time Debugger.

Note

Readers who wish to execute this example may need to modify the hard-coded function locations for MessageBoxA and ExitProcess. These addresses can be found as described in the text. Once the addresses have been found, you can patch helloworld.bin within OllyDbg by placing the cursor on the instruction that loads the hard-coded function location into register EAX and then pressing the spacebar. This brings up OllyDbg’s Assemble At dialog, which allows you to enter your own assembly code. This will be assembled by OllyDbg and overwrite the current instruction. Simply replace the 7E4507EAh value with the correct value from your machine, and OllyDbg will patch the program in memory, allowing the shellcode to execute correctly.

Using fnstenv

The x87 floating-point unit (FPU) provides a separate execution environment within the normal x86 architecture. It contains a separate set of special-purpose registers that need to be saved by the OS on a context switch when a process is performing floating-point arithmetic with the FPU. Example 19-2 shows the 28-byte structure used by the fstenv and fnstenv instructions to store the state of the FPU to memory when executing in 32-bit protected mode.

Example 19-2. FpuSaveState structure definition

struct FpuSaveState {
    uint32_t    control_word;
    uint32_t    status_word;
    uint32_t    tag_word;
    uint32_t    fpu_instruction_pointer;
    uint16_t    fpu_instruction_selector;
    uint16_t    fpu_opcode;
    uint32_t    fpu_operand_pointer;
    uint16_t    fpu_operand_selector;
    uint16_t    reserved;
};

The only field that matters for use here is fpu_instruction_pointer at byte offset 12. This will contain the address of the last CPU instruction that used the FPU, providing context information for exception handlers to identify which FPU instructions may have caused a fault. This field is required because the FPU is running in parallel with the CPU. If the FPU generates an exception, the exception handler cannot simply look at the interrupt return address to identify the instruction that caused the fault.

Example 19-3 shows the disassembly of another Hello World program that uses fnstenv to obtain the EIP value.

Example 19-3. fnstenv Hello World example

Bytes            Disassembly
83 EC 20         sub     esp, 20h
31 D2            xor     edx, edx
EB 15            jmp     short loc_1C
EA 07 45 7E      dd 7E4507EAh               ; MessageBoxA
FA CA 81 7C      dd 7C81CAFAh               ; ExitProcess
48 65 6C 6C 6F   db 'Hello World!',0
20 57 6F 72 6C
64 21 00

loc_1C:

D9 EE            fldz 
D9 74 24 F4      fnstenv byte ptr [esp-0Ch] 
5B               pop     ebx               ; ebx points to fldz
8D 7B F3         lea     edi, [ebx-0Dh]    ; load HelloWorld pointer
52               push    edx                ; uType: MB_OK
57               push    edi                ; lpCaption
57               push    edi                ; lpText
52               push    edx                ; hWnd: NULL
8B 43 EB         mov     eax, [ebx-15h]    ; load MessageBoxA
FF D0            call    eax                ; call MessageBoxA
52               push    edx                ; uExitCode
8B 43 EF         mov     eax, [ebx-11h]    ; load ExitProcess
FF D0            call    eax                ; call ExitProcess

The fldz instruction at pushes the floating-point number 0.0 onto the FPU stack. The fpu_instruction_pointer value is updated within the FPU to point to the fldz instruction.

Performing the fnstenv at stores the FpuSaveState structure onto the stack at [esp-0ch], which allows the shellcode to do a pop at that loads EBX with the fpu_instruction_pointer value. Once the pop executes, EBX will contain a value that points to the location of the fldz instruction in memory. The shellcode then starts using EBX as a base register to access the data embedded in the code.

As in the previous Hello World example, which used the call/pop technique, this code calls MessageBoxA and ExitProcess using hard-coded locations, but here the function locations are stored as data along with the ASCII string to print. The lea instruction at loads the address of the Hello World! string by subtracting 0x0d from the address of the fldz instruction stored in EBX. The mov instruction at loads the first function location for MessageBoxA, and the mov instruction at loads the second function location for ExitProcess.

Note

Example 19-3 is a contrived example, but it is common for shellcode to store or create function pointer arrays. We used the fldz instruction in this example, but any non-control FPU instruction can be used.

This example can be executed using shellcode_launcher.exe with the following command:

shellcode_launcher.exe -i hellofstenv.bin -bp -L user32