Table of Contents for
Practical Malware Analysis

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical Malware Analysis by Andrew Honig Published by No Starch Press, 2012
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Malware Analysis: The Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software
  3. Praise for Practical Malware Analysis
  4. Warning
  5. About the Authors
  6. About the Technical Reviewer
  7. About the Contributing Authors
  8. Foreword
  9. Acknowledgments
  10. Individual Thanks
  11. Introduction
  12. What Is Malware Analysis?
  13. Prerequisites
  14. Practical, Hands-On Learning
  15. What’s in the Book?
  16. 0. Malware Analysis Primer
  17. The Goals of Malware Analysis
  18. Malware Analysis Techniques
  19. Types of Malware
  20. General Rules for Malware Analysis
  21. I. Basic Analysis
  22. 1. Basic Static Techniques
  23. Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step
  24. Hashing: A Fingerprint for Malware
  25. Finding Strings
  26. Packed and Obfuscated Malware
  27. Portable Executable File Format
  28. Linked Libraries and Functions
  29. Static Analysis in Practice
  30. The PE File Headers and Sections
  31. Conclusion
  32. Labs
  33. 2. Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines
  34. The Structure of a Virtual Machine
  35. Creating Your Malware Analysis Machine
  36. Using Your Malware Analysis Machine
  37. The Risks of Using VMware for Malware Analysis
  38. Record/Replay: Running Your Computer in Reverse
  39. Conclusion
  40. 3. Basic Dynamic Analysis
  41. Sandboxes: The Quick-and-Dirty Approach
  42. Running Malware
  43. Monitoring with Process Monitor
  44. Viewing Processes with Process Explorer
  45. Comparing Registry Snapshots with Regshot
  46. Faking a Network
  47. Packet Sniffing with Wireshark
  48. Using INetSim
  49. Basic Dynamic Tools in Practice
  50. Conclusion
  51. Labs
  52. II. Advanced Static Analysis
  53. 4. A Crash Course in x86 Disassembly
  54. Levels of Abstraction
  55. Reverse-Engineering
  56. The x86 Architecture
  57. Conclusion
  58. 5. IDA Pro
  59. Loading an Executable
  60. The IDA Pro Interface
  61. Using Cross-References
  62. Analyzing Functions
  63. Using Graphing Options
  64. Enhancing Disassembly
  65. Extending IDA with Plug-ins
  66. Conclusion
  67. Labs
  68. 6. Recognizing C Code Constructs in Assembly
  69. Global vs. Local Variables
  70. Disassembling Arithmetic Operations
  71. Recognizing if Statements
  72. Recognizing Loops
  73. Understanding Function Call Conventions
  74. Analyzing switch Statements
  75. Disassembling Arrays
  76. Identifying Structs
  77. Analyzing Linked List Traversal
  78. Conclusion
  79. Labs
  80. 7. Analyzing Malicious Windows Programs
  81. The Windows API
  82. The Windows Registry
  83. Networking APIs
  84. Following Running Malware
  85. Kernel vs. User Mode
  86. The Native API
  87. Conclusion
  88. Labs
  89. III. Advanced Dynamic Analysis
  90. 8. Debugging
  91. Source-Level vs. Assembly-Level Debuggers
  92. Kernel vs. User-Mode Debugging
  93. Using a Debugger
  94. Exceptions
  95. Modifying Execution with a Debugger
  96. Modifying Program Execution in Practice
  97. Conclusion
  98. 9. OllyDbg
  99. Loading Malware
  100. The OllyDbg Interface
  101. Memory Map
  102. Viewing Threads and Stacks
  103. Executing Code
  104. Breakpoints
  105. Loading DLLs
  106. Tracing
  107. Exception Handling
  108. Patching
  109. Analyzing Shellcode
  110. Assistance Features
  111. Plug-ins
  112. Scriptable Debugging
  113. Conclusion
  114. Labs
  115. 10. Kernel Debugging with WinDbg
  116. Drivers and Kernel Code
  117. Setting Up Kernel Debugging
  118. Using WinDbg
  119. Microsoft Symbols
  120. Kernel Debugging in Practice
  121. Rootkits
  122. Loading Drivers
  123. Kernel Issues for Windows Vista, Windows 7, and x64 Versions
  124. Conclusion
  125. Labs
  126. IV. Malware Functionality
  127. 11. Malware Behavior
  128. Downloaders and Launchers
  129. Backdoors
  130. Credential Stealers
  131. Persistence Mechanisms
  132. Privilege Escalation
  133. Covering Its Tracks—User-Mode Rootkits
  134. Conclusion
  135. Labs
  136. 12. Covert Malware Launching
  137. Launchers
  138. Process Injection
  139. Process Replacement
  140. Hook Injection
  141. Detours
  142. APC Injection
  143. Conclusion
  144. Labs
  145. 13. Data Encoding
  146. The Goal of Analyzing Encoding Algorithms
  147. Simple Ciphers
  148. Common Cryptographic Algorithms
  149. Custom Encoding
  150. Decoding
  151. Conclusion
  152. Labs
  153. 14. Malware-Focused Network Signatures
  154. Network Countermeasures
  155. Safely Investigate an Attacker Online
  156. Content-Based Network Countermeasures
  157. Combining Dynamic and Static Analysis Techniques
  158. Understanding the Attacker’s Perspective
  159. Conclusion
  160. Labs
  161. V. Anti-Reverse-Engineering
  162. 15. Anti-Disassembly
  163. Understanding Anti-Disassembly
  164. Defeating Disassembly Algorithms
  165. Anti-Disassembly Techniques
  166. Obscuring Flow Control
  167. Thwarting Stack-Frame Analysis
  168. Conclusion
  169. Labs
  170. 16. Anti-Debugging
  171. Windows Debugger Detection
  172. Identifying Debugger Behavior
  173. Interfering with Debugger Functionality
  174. Debugger Vulnerabilities
  175. Conclusion
  176. Labs
  177. 17. Anti-Virtual Machine Techniques
  178. VMware Artifacts
  179. Vulnerable Instructions
  180. Tweaking Settings
  181. Escaping the Virtual Machine
  182. Conclusion
  183. Labs
  184. 18. Packers and Unpacking
  185. Packer Anatomy
  186. Identifying Packed Programs
  187. Unpacking Options
  188. Automated Unpacking
  189. Manual Unpacking
  190. Tips and Tricks for Common Packers
  191. Analyzing Without Fully Unpacking
  192. Packed DLLs
  193. Conclusion
  194. Labs
  195. VI. Special Topics
  196. 19. Shellcode Analysis
  197. Loading Shellcode for Analysis
  198. Position-Independent Code
  199. Identifying Execution Location
  200. Manual Symbol Resolution
  201. A Full Hello World Example
  202. Shellcode Encodings
  203. NOP Sleds
  204. Finding Shellcode
  205. Conclusion
  206. Labs
  207. 20. C++ Analysis
  208. Object-Oriented Programming
  209. Virtual vs. Nonvirtual Functions
  210. Creating and Destroying Objects
  211. Conclusion
  212. Labs
  213. 21. 64-Bit Malware
  214. Why 64-Bit Malware?
  215. Differences in x64 Architecture
  216. Windows 32-Bit on Windows 64-Bit
  217. 64-Bit Hints at Malware Functionality
  218. Conclusion
  219. Labs
  220. A. Important Windows Functions
  221. B. Tools for Malware Analysis
  222. C. Solutions to Labs
  223. Lab 1-1 Solutions
  224. Lab 1-2 Solutions
  225. Lab 1-3 Solutions
  226. Lab 1-4 Solutions
  227. Lab 3-1 Solutions
  228. Lab 3-2 Solutions
  229. Lab 3-3 Solutions
  230. Lab 3-4 Solutions
  231. Lab 5-1 Solutions
  232. Lab 6-1 Solutions
  233. Lab 6-2 Solutions
  234. Lab 6-3 Solutions
  235. Lab 6-4 Solutions
  236. Lab 7-1 Solutions
  237. Lab 7-2 Solutions
  238. Lab 7-3 Solutions
  239. Lab 9-1 Solutions
  240. Lab 9-2 Solutions
  241. Lab 9-3 Solutions
  242. Lab 10-1 Solutions
  243. Lab 10-2 Solutions
  244. Lab 10-3 Solutions
  245. Lab 11-1 Solutions
  246. Lab 11-2 Solutions
  247. Lab 11-3 Solutions
  248. Lab 12-1 Solutions
  249. Lab 12-2 Solutions
  250. Lab 12-3 Solutions
  251. Lab 12-4 Solutions
  252. Lab 13-1 Solutions
  253. Lab 13-2 Solutions
  254. Lab 13-3 Solutions
  255. Lab 14-1 Solutions
  256. Lab 14-2 Solutions
  257. Lab 14-3 Solutions
  258. Lab 15-1 Solutions
  259. Lab 15-2 Solutions
  260. Lab 15-3 Solutions
  261. Lab 16-1 Solutions
  262. Lab 16-2 Solutions
  263. Lab 16-3 Solutions
  264. Lab 17-1 Solutions
  265. Lab 17-2 Solutions
  266. Lab 17-3 Solutions
  267. Lab 18-1 Solutions
  268. Lab 18-2 Solutions
  269. Lab 18-3 Solutions
  270. Lab 18-4 Solutions
  271. Lab 18-5 Solutions
  272. Lab 19-1 Solutions
  273. Lab 19-2 Solutions
  274. Lab 19-3 Solutions
  275. Lab 20-1 Solutions
  276. Lab 20-2 Solutions
  277. Lab 20-3 Solutions
  278. Lab 21-1 Solutions
  279. Lab 21-2 Solutions
  280. Index
  281. Index
  282. Index
  283. Index
  284. Index
  285. Index
  286. Index
  287. Index
  288. Index
  289. Index
  290. Index
  291. Index
  292. Index
  293. Index
  294. Index
  295. Index
  296. Index
  297. Index
  298. Index
  299. Index
  300. Index
  301. Index
  302. Index
  303. Index
  304. Index
  305. Index
  306. Index
  307. Updates
  308. About the Authors
  309. Copyright

Lab 18-5 Solutions

The program in the Lab18-05.exe file is Lab07-01.exe packed with WinUpack. When we load this file into PEiD, it’s recognized as being packed with WinUpack 0.39. However, the file’s PE header is badly damaged. If we load it into OllyDbg, IDA Pro, or PEview, we get several errors that make it impossible to view information from the PE header.

We load the file into OllyDbg and see an error stating “Bad or unknown format of 32-bit executable file.” OllyDbg can load the file, but it can’t find the entry point for the unpacking stub and instead breaks at the system breakpoint, which occurs well before the unpacking stub.

Because we have not even reached the unpacking stub, most of our techniques will not work. We could step-into and step-over instructions carefully until we reach the unpacking stub, and then work from there, but that would be a long and frustrating process. Instead, we will set breakpoints on LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress in order to bypass the beginning of the unpacking stub.

We know that loading imported libraries and resolving the imports with GetProcAddress are a couple of the last steps performed by the unpacking stub. If we can set a breakpoint that is triggered on the last call to GetProcAddress, we’ll be very close to the tail jump, but there’s no way to know which call to GetProcAddress is last until after the call is executed. Instead, we set breakpoints on LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress, and use trial-and-error to figure out which call is last.

We begin by setting a breakpoint on the first instruction of LoadLibrary by pressing CTRL-G and entering LoadLibraryA into the dialog. This should take us to the first instruction of LoadLibraryA, where we press F2 to set a breakpoint. We then repeat the process with LoadLibraryW so that we have a breakpoint on both versions of LoadLibrary, and then press F9 to start the program.

We’re using the fact that LoadLibrary is called as a way to bypass as much of the unpacking stub as possible because we want to keep running the program until the last call to LoadLibrary. Because we don’t know which call to LoadLibrary is the last one (until it’s too late), each time the breakpoint is hit, we continue running the program and note the library being loaded. If the library being loaded is not the last one, the program will stop very quickly once the next library is loaded. When the last library is loaded, the program should continue running, and that is how we know we have found the last call to LoadLibrary. When we set our breakpoint on LoadLibrary, we see that the first library loaded is kernel32.dll, followed by advapi32.dll, and so on. The fifth and sixth calls to LoadLibrary load commctrl.dll. After the sixth call, we continue running the program, and it does not stop. The sixth call is the final one.

Now we restart our program. We reset our breakpoint on LoadLibrary, and then run the program until the breakpoint is hit a sixth time and the parameter is commctrl. Next, we set a breakpoint on GetProcAddress and perform the same procedure to determine which API function is the last to be resolved with GetProcAddress.

We run the program several times to find out which function is loaded last. After a call to GetProcAddress with the value InternetOpenA, we see that the program continues to run without hitting our breakpoint again. Now we restart our program once again. We reset our breakpoints on LoadLibraryA and LoadLibraryW, and run the program until the final call to LoadLibrary. Then we run the program until the final call to GetProcAddress.

Resolving the imports is nearly the last step in the unpacking stub. The only task remaining after resolving the imports is the transfer of control to the OEP. The unpacking stub is nearly finished, and we can step through the code to find the OEP.

We step through the rest of the GetProcAddress until the ret instruction brings us back to the unpacking stub, and then we continue to step through the code until we see what looks like the tail jump. The next control transfer instruction is shown here:

00408EB4   STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]
00408EB5   JMP SHORT Lab07_01.00408E9E

This is not the tail jump because it’s relatively short and goes to the following code, which doesn’t look like the start of a program.

00408E9E   LODS BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
00408E9F   TEST AL,AL
00408EA1   JNZ SHORT Lab07_01.00408E9E

These instructions form a short loop, and we step through this code until the loop is finished. When the loop is complete, the code falls through to these instructions:

00408EA3   CMP BYTE PTR DS:[ESI],AL
00408EA5   JE SHORT Lab07_01.00408E91

This is also not the tail jump because it is relatively short and the code at the target doesn’t look like the start of a program.

00408E91   POP ECX
00408E92   INC ESI
00408E93   LODS DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
00408E94   TEST EAX,EAX
00408E96   JE SHORT Lab07_01.00408EB7

The jump at this next block of code goes to a retn instruction. A normal program would never start with a retn instruction, so we also know that isn’t the tail jump.

00408EB7   C3               RETN

When we step-over the retn instruction, we see the code shown in Example C-185.

Example C-185. The OEP for Lab18-05.exe

00401190  PUSH EBP
00401191   MOV EBP,ESP
00401193   PUSH -1
00401195   PUSH Lab07_01.004040D0
0040119A   PUSH Lab07_01.00401C58
0040119F   MOV EAX,DWORD PTR FS:[0]
004011A5   PUSH EAX
004011A6   MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0],ESP
004011AD   SUB ESP,10
004011B0   PUSH EBX
004011B1   PUSH ESI
004011B2   PUSH EDI
004011B3   MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18],ESP
004011B6  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[40404C]               ; kernel32.GetVersion
004011BC   XOR EDX,EDX
004011BE   MOV DL,AH
004011C0   MOV DWORD PTR DS:[405304],EDX
004011C6   MOV ECX,EAX
004011C8   AND ECX,0FF
004011CE   MOV DWORD PTR DS:[405300],ECX
004011D4   SHL ECX,8
004011D7   ADD ECX,EDX
004011D9   MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4052FC],ECX
004011DF   SHR EAX,10
004011E2   MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4052F8],EAX
004011E7   PUSH 0
004011E9   CALL Lab07_01.00401B21
004011EE   POP ECX
004011EF   TEST EAX,EAX
004011F1   JNZ SHORT Lab07_01.004011FB
004011F3   PUSH 1C
004011F5   CALL Lab07_01.00401294
004011FA   POP ECX
004011FB   AND DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-4],0
004011FF   CALL Lab07_01.00401976
00401204  CALL DWORD PTR DS:[404048]               ; kernel32.GetCommandLineA
0040120A   MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4057F8],EAX
0040120F   CALL Lab07_01.00401844
00401214   MOV DWORD PTR DS:[4052E0],EAX
00401219   CALL Lab07_01.004015F7

This looks like the OEP for several reasons:

  1. It’s a relatively far jump.

  2. The code starts with a push ebp at , which indicates the beginning of a function.

  3. The code in this function calls GetVersion at and GetCommandLineA at , which are commonly called at the very beginning of a program.

Having identified the OEP, we use Plugins ▸ OllyDump ▸ Dump Debugged Process to dump the unpacked program. Next, we load the program into IDA Pro, but, unfortunately, we get some errors. Apparently, the program’s file headers are not fully repaired. However, IDA Pro has labeled the main function anyway, so we can analyze the program even though the PE file isn’t fully reconstructed.

The biggest roadblock is that we don’t have any import information. However, we can easily spot the calls to imported functions by looking for calls to data locations. For example, let’s look at the main method, as shown in Example C-186.

Example C-186. The main method for unpacked Lab18-05.exe

00401000   sub     esp, 10h
00401003   lea     eax, [esp+10h+var_10]
00401007   mov     [esp+10h+var_10], offset aMalservice ; "MalService"
0040100F   push    eax
00401010   mov     [esp+14h+var_C], offset sub_401040
00401018   mov     [esp+14h+var_8], 0
00401020   mov     [esp+14h+var_4], 0
00401028  call    dword_404004
0040102E   push    0
00401030   push    0
00401032   call    sub_401040
00401037   add     esp, 18h
0040103A   retn

The call at jumps out as a call to an imported function. You can click the DWORD to view the address of the imported functions for this program, as shown in Example C-187.

Example C-187. Imported functions that have not been recognized by IDA Pro

00404000 dword_404000    dd 77E371E9h
00404004 dword_404004    dd 77E37EB1h
00404008 dword_404008    dd 77DF697Eh
0040400C                 align 10h
00404010 dword_404010    dd 7C862AC1h
00404014 dword_404014    dd 7C810BACh

To make the unpacked code easier to analyze, we turn to OllyDbg to find out which function is stored at those locations. The easiest way to identify which imported function is stored at a given address in OllyDbg is to change the value of any register to the address you want to look up. For example, to identify the imported function stored at dword_404004, double-click eax and enter the value 0x77E37EB1. We see that OllyDbg labels the address as Advapi32.StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA. We can rename the DWORD address in IDA Pro to StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA. Now whenever the malware calls the recently renamed address, it will be labeled as StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA, instead of dword_404004.

We can repeat this process for each imported function, and then we will have a program that we can analyze in IDA Pro as if it were never packed. We still have not created a working version of the unpacked file, but it doesn’t really matter, because we can analyze the file without it. Looking at the file, we can tell that this is the same as Lab07-01.exe.