Table of Contents for
Practical Malware Analysis

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical Malware Analysis by Andrew Honig Published by No Starch Press, 2012
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Malware Analysis: The Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software
  3. Praise for Practical Malware Analysis
  4. Warning
  5. About the Authors
  6. About the Technical Reviewer
  7. About the Contributing Authors
  8. Foreword
  9. Acknowledgments
  10. Individual Thanks
  11. Introduction
  12. What Is Malware Analysis?
  13. Prerequisites
  14. Practical, Hands-On Learning
  15. What’s in the Book?
  16. 0. Malware Analysis Primer
  17. The Goals of Malware Analysis
  18. Malware Analysis Techniques
  19. Types of Malware
  20. General Rules for Malware Analysis
  21. I. Basic Analysis
  22. 1. Basic Static Techniques
  23. Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step
  24. Hashing: A Fingerprint for Malware
  25. Finding Strings
  26. Packed and Obfuscated Malware
  27. Portable Executable File Format
  28. Linked Libraries and Functions
  29. Static Analysis in Practice
  30. The PE File Headers and Sections
  31. Conclusion
  32. Labs
  33. 2. Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines
  34. The Structure of a Virtual Machine
  35. Creating Your Malware Analysis Machine
  36. Using Your Malware Analysis Machine
  37. The Risks of Using VMware for Malware Analysis
  38. Record/Replay: Running Your Computer in Reverse
  39. Conclusion
  40. 3. Basic Dynamic Analysis
  41. Sandboxes: The Quick-and-Dirty Approach
  42. Running Malware
  43. Monitoring with Process Monitor
  44. Viewing Processes with Process Explorer
  45. Comparing Registry Snapshots with Regshot
  46. Faking a Network
  47. Packet Sniffing with Wireshark
  48. Using INetSim
  49. Basic Dynamic Tools in Practice
  50. Conclusion
  51. Labs
  52. II. Advanced Static Analysis
  53. 4. A Crash Course in x86 Disassembly
  54. Levels of Abstraction
  55. Reverse-Engineering
  56. The x86 Architecture
  57. Conclusion
  58. 5. IDA Pro
  59. Loading an Executable
  60. The IDA Pro Interface
  61. Using Cross-References
  62. Analyzing Functions
  63. Using Graphing Options
  64. Enhancing Disassembly
  65. Extending IDA with Plug-ins
  66. Conclusion
  67. Labs
  68. 6. Recognizing C Code Constructs in Assembly
  69. Global vs. Local Variables
  70. Disassembling Arithmetic Operations
  71. Recognizing if Statements
  72. Recognizing Loops
  73. Understanding Function Call Conventions
  74. Analyzing switch Statements
  75. Disassembling Arrays
  76. Identifying Structs
  77. Analyzing Linked List Traversal
  78. Conclusion
  79. Labs
  80. 7. Analyzing Malicious Windows Programs
  81. The Windows API
  82. The Windows Registry
  83. Networking APIs
  84. Following Running Malware
  85. Kernel vs. User Mode
  86. The Native API
  87. Conclusion
  88. Labs
  89. III. Advanced Dynamic Analysis
  90. 8. Debugging
  91. Source-Level vs. Assembly-Level Debuggers
  92. Kernel vs. User-Mode Debugging
  93. Using a Debugger
  94. Exceptions
  95. Modifying Execution with a Debugger
  96. Modifying Program Execution in Practice
  97. Conclusion
  98. 9. OllyDbg
  99. Loading Malware
  100. The OllyDbg Interface
  101. Memory Map
  102. Viewing Threads and Stacks
  103. Executing Code
  104. Breakpoints
  105. Loading DLLs
  106. Tracing
  107. Exception Handling
  108. Patching
  109. Analyzing Shellcode
  110. Assistance Features
  111. Plug-ins
  112. Scriptable Debugging
  113. Conclusion
  114. Labs
  115. 10. Kernel Debugging with WinDbg
  116. Drivers and Kernel Code
  117. Setting Up Kernel Debugging
  118. Using WinDbg
  119. Microsoft Symbols
  120. Kernel Debugging in Practice
  121. Rootkits
  122. Loading Drivers
  123. Kernel Issues for Windows Vista, Windows 7, and x64 Versions
  124. Conclusion
  125. Labs
  126. IV. Malware Functionality
  127. 11. Malware Behavior
  128. Downloaders and Launchers
  129. Backdoors
  130. Credential Stealers
  131. Persistence Mechanisms
  132. Privilege Escalation
  133. Covering Its Tracks—User-Mode Rootkits
  134. Conclusion
  135. Labs
  136. 12. Covert Malware Launching
  137. Launchers
  138. Process Injection
  139. Process Replacement
  140. Hook Injection
  141. Detours
  142. APC Injection
  143. Conclusion
  144. Labs
  145. 13. Data Encoding
  146. The Goal of Analyzing Encoding Algorithms
  147. Simple Ciphers
  148. Common Cryptographic Algorithms
  149. Custom Encoding
  150. Decoding
  151. Conclusion
  152. Labs
  153. 14. Malware-Focused Network Signatures
  154. Network Countermeasures
  155. Safely Investigate an Attacker Online
  156. Content-Based Network Countermeasures
  157. Combining Dynamic and Static Analysis Techniques
  158. Understanding the Attacker’s Perspective
  159. Conclusion
  160. Labs
  161. V. Anti-Reverse-Engineering
  162. 15. Anti-Disassembly
  163. Understanding Anti-Disassembly
  164. Defeating Disassembly Algorithms
  165. Anti-Disassembly Techniques
  166. Obscuring Flow Control
  167. Thwarting Stack-Frame Analysis
  168. Conclusion
  169. Labs
  170. 16. Anti-Debugging
  171. Windows Debugger Detection
  172. Identifying Debugger Behavior
  173. Interfering with Debugger Functionality
  174. Debugger Vulnerabilities
  175. Conclusion
  176. Labs
  177. 17. Anti-Virtual Machine Techniques
  178. VMware Artifacts
  179. Vulnerable Instructions
  180. Tweaking Settings
  181. Escaping the Virtual Machine
  182. Conclusion
  183. Labs
  184. 18. Packers and Unpacking
  185. Packer Anatomy
  186. Identifying Packed Programs
  187. Unpacking Options
  188. Automated Unpacking
  189. Manual Unpacking
  190. Tips and Tricks for Common Packers
  191. Analyzing Without Fully Unpacking
  192. Packed DLLs
  193. Conclusion
  194. Labs
  195. VI. Special Topics
  196. 19. Shellcode Analysis
  197. Loading Shellcode for Analysis
  198. Position-Independent Code
  199. Identifying Execution Location
  200. Manual Symbol Resolution
  201. A Full Hello World Example
  202. Shellcode Encodings
  203. NOP Sleds
  204. Finding Shellcode
  205. Conclusion
  206. Labs
  207. 20. C++ Analysis
  208. Object-Oriented Programming
  209. Virtual vs. Nonvirtual Functions
  210. Creating and Destroying Objects
  211. Conclusion
  212. Labs
  213. 21. 64-Bit Malware
  214. Why 64-Bit Malware?
  215. Differences in x64 Architecture
  216. Windows 32-Bit on Windows 64-Bit
  217. 64-Bit Hints at Malware Functionality
  218. Conclusion
  219. Labs
  220. A. Important Windows Functions
  221. B. Tools for Malware Analysis
  222. C. Solutions to Labs
  223. Lab 1-1 Solutions
  224. Lab 1-2 Solutions
  225. Lab 1-3 Solutions
  226. Lab 1-4 Solutions
  227. Lab 3-1 Solutions
  228. Lab 3-2 Solutions
  229. Lab 3-3 Solutions
  230. Lab 3-4 Solutions
  231. Lab 5-1 Solutions
  232. Lab 6-1 Solutions
  233. Lab 6-2 Solutions
  234. Lab 6-3 Solutions
  235. Lab 6-4 Solutions
  236. Lab 7-1 Solutions
  237. Lab 7-2 Solutions
  238. Lab 7-3 Solutions
  239. Lab 9-1 Solutions
  240. Lab 9-2 Solutions
  241. Lab 9-3 Solutions
  242. Lab 10-1 Solutions
  243. Lab 10-2 Solutions
  244. Lab 10-3 Solutions
  245. Lab 11-1 Solutions
  246. Lab 11-2 Solutions
  247. Lab 11-3 Solutions
  248. Lab 12-1 Solutions
  249. Lab 12-2 Solutions
  250. Lab 12-3 Solutions
  251. Lab 12-4 Solutions
  252. Lab 13-1 Solutions
  253. Lab 13-2 Solutions
  254. Lab 13-3 Solutions
  255. Lab 14-1 Solutions
  256. Lab 14-2 Solutions
  257. Lab 14-3 Solutions
  258. Lab 15-1 Solutions
  259. Lab 15-2 Solutions
  260. Lab 15-3 Solutions
  261. Lab 16-1 Solutions
  262. Lab 16-2 Solutions
  263. Lab 16-3 Solutions
  264. Lab 17-1 Solutions
  265. Lab 17-2 Solutions
  266. Lab 17-3 Solutions
  267. Lab 18-1 Solutions
  268. Lab 18-2 Solutions
  269. Lab 18-3 Solutions
  270. Lab 18-4 Solutions
  271. Lab 18-5 Solutions
  272. Lab 19-1 Solutions
  273. Lab 19-2 Solutions
  274. Lab 19-3 Solutions
  275. Lab 20-1 Solutions
  276. Lab 20-2 Solutions
  277. Lab 20-3 Solutions
  278. Lab 21-1 Solutions
  279. Lab 21-2 Solutions
  280. Index
  281. Index
  282. Index
  283. Index
  284. Index
  285. Index
  286. Index
  287. Index
  288. Index
  289. Index
  290. Index
  291. Index
  292. Index
  293. Index
  294. Index
  295. Index
  296. Index
  297. Index
  298. Index
  299. Index
  300. Index
  301. Index
  302. Index
  303. Index
  304. Index
  305. Index
  306. Index
  307. Updates
  308. About the Authors
  309. Copyright

Interfering with Debugger Functionality

Malware can use several techniques to interfere with normal debugger operation: thread local storage (TLS) callbacks, exceptions, and interrupt insertion. These techniques try to disrupt the program’s execution only if it is under the control of a debugger.

Using TLS Callbacks

You might think that when you load a program into a debugger, it will pause at the first instruction the program executes, but this is not always the case. Most debuggers start at the program’s entry point as defined by the PE header. A TLS callback can be used to execute code before the entry point and therefore execute secretly in a debugger. If you rely only on the use of a debugger, you could miss certain malware functionality, as the TLS callback can run as soon as it is loaded into the debugger.

TLS is a Windows storage class in which a data object is not an automatic stack variable, yet is local to each thread that runs the code. Basically, TLS allows each thread to maintain a different value for a variable declared using TLS. When TLS is implemented by an executable, the code will typically contain a .tls section in the PE header, as shown in Figure 16-1. TLS supports callback functions for initialization and termination of TLS data objects. Windows executes these functions before running code at the normal start of a program.

TLS callback example—a TLS table in PEview

Figure 16-1. TLS callback example—a TLS table in PEview

TLS callbacks can be discovered by viewing the .tls section using PEview. You should immediately suspect anti-debugging if you see a .tls section, as normal programs typically do not use this section.

Analysis of TLS callbacks is easy with IDA Pro. Once IDA Pro has finished its analysis, you can view the entry points for a binary by pressing CTRL-E to display all entry points to the program, including TLS callbacks, as shown in Figure 16-2. All TLS callback functions have their labels prepended with TlsCallback. You can browse to the callback function in IDA Pro by double-clicking the function name.

Viewing a TLS callback function in IDA Pro (press CTRL-E to display)

Figure 16-2. Viewing a TLS callback function in IDA Pro (press CTRL-E to display)

TLS callbacks can be handled within a debugger, though sometimes debuggers will run the TLS callback before breaking at the initial entry point. To avoid this problem, change the debugger’s settings. For example, if you’re using OllyDbg, you can have it pause before the TLS callback by selecting OptionsDebugging OptionsEvents and setting System breakpoint as the place for the first pause, as shown in Figure 16-3.

Note

OllyDbg 2.0 has more breaking capabilities than version 1.1; for example, it can pause at the start of a TLS callback. Also, WinDbg always breaks at the system breakpoint before the TLS callbacks.

OllyDbg first pause options

Figure 16-3. OllyDbg first pause options

Because TLS callbacks are well known, malware uses them less frequently than in the past. Not many legitimate applications use TLS callbacks, so a .tls section in an executable can stand out.

Using Exceptions

As discussed earlier, interrupts generate exceptions that are used by the debugger to perform operations like breakpoints. In Chapter 15, you learned how to set up an SEH to achieve an unconventional jump. The modification of the SEH chain applies to both anti-disassembly and anti-debugging. In this section, we will skip the SEH specifics (since they were addressed in Chapter 15) and focus on other ways that exceptions can be used to hamper the malware analyst.

Exceptions can be used to disrupt or detect a debugger. Most exception-based detection relies on the fact that debuggers will trap the exception and not immediately pass it to the process being debugged for handling. The default setting on most debuggers is to trap exceptions and not pass them to the program. If the debugger doesn’t pass the exception to the process properly, that failure can be detected within the process exception-handling mechanism.

Figure 16-4 shows OllyDbg’s default settings; all exceptions will be trapped unless the box is checked. These options are accessed via OptionsDebugging OptionsExceptions.

Ollydbg exception processing options

Figure 16-4. Ollydbg exception processing options

Note

When performing malware analysis, we recommend setting the debugging options to pass all of the exceptions to the program.

Inserting Interrupts

A classic form of anti-debugging is to use exceptions to annoy the analyst and disrupt normal program execution by inserting interrupts in the middle of a valid instruction sequence. Depending on the debugger settings, these insertions could cause the debugger to stop, since it is the same mechanism the debugger itself uses to set software breakpoints.

Inserting INT 3

Because INT 3 is used by debuggers to set software breakpoints, one anti-debugging technique consists of inserting 0xCC opcodes into valid sections of code in order to trick the debugger into thinking that the opcodes are its breakpoints. Some debuggers track where they set software breakpoints in order to avoid falling for this trick.

The 2-byte opcode sequence 0xCD03 can also be used to generate an INT 3, and this is often a valid way for malware to interfere with WinDbg. Outside a debugger, 0xCD03 generates a STATUS_BREAKPOINT exception. However, inside WinDbg, it catches the breakpoint and then silently advances EIP by exactly 1 byte, since a breakpoint is normally the 0xCC opcode. This can cause the program to execute a different set of instructions when being debugged by WinDbg versus running normally. (OllyDbg is not vulnerable to interference using this 2-byte INT 3 attack.)

Example 16-9 shows assembly code that implements this technique. This example sets a new SEH and then calls INT 3 to force the code to continue.

Example 16-9. INT 3 technique

push offset continue
push dword fs:[0]
mov fs:[0], esp
int 3
//being debugged
continue:
//not being debugged

Inserting INT 2D

The INT 2D anti-debugging technique functions like INT 3—the INT 0x2D instruction is used to access the kernel debugger. Because INT 0x2D is the way that kernel debuggers set breakpoints, the method shown in Listing 16-9 applies.

Inserting ICE

One of Intel’s undocumented instructions is the In-Circuit Emulator (ICE) breakpoint, icebp (opcode 0xF1). This instruction is designed to make it easier to debug using an ICE, because it is difficult to set an arbitrary breakpoint with an ICE.

Executing this instruction generates a single-step exception. If the program is being traced via single-stepping, the debugger will think it is the normal exception generated by the single-step and not execute a previously set exception handler. Malware can take advantage of this by using the exception handler for its normal execution flow, which would be disrupted in this case.

In order to bypass this technique, do not single-step over an icebp instruction.