Table of Contents for
Practical Malware Analysis

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical Malware Analysis by Andrew Honig Published by No Starch Press, 2012
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Malware Analysis: The Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software
  3. Praise for Practical Malware Analysis
  4. Warning
  5. About the Authors
  6. About the Technical Reviewer
  7. About the Contributing Authors
  8. Foreword
  9. Acknowledgments
  10. Individual Thanks
  11. Introduction
  12. What Is Malware Analysis?
  13. Prerequisites
  14. Practical, Hands-On Learning
  15. What’s in the Book?
  16. 0. Malware Analysis Primer
  17. The Goals of Malware Analysis
  18. Malware Analysis Techniques
  19. Types of Malware
  20. General Rules for Malware Analysis
  21. I. Basic Analysis
  22. 1. Basic Static Techniques
  23. Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step
  24. Hashing: A Fingerprint for Malware
  25. Finding Strings
  26. Packed and Obfuscated Malware
  27. Portable Executable File Format
  28. Linked Libraries and Functions
  29. Static Analysis in Practice
  30. The PE File Headers and Sections
  31. Conclusion
  32. Labs
  33. 2. Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines
  34. The Structure of a Virtual Machine
  35. Creating Your Malware Analysis Machine
  36. Using Your Malware Analysis Machine
  37. The Risks of Using VMware for Malware Analysis
  38. Record/Replay: Running Your Computer in Reverse
  39. Conclusion
  40. 3. Basic Dynamic Analysis
  41. Sandboxes: The Quick-and-Dirty Approach
  42. Running Malware
  43. Monitoring with Process Monitor
  44. Viewing Processes with Process Explorer
  45. Comparing Registry Snapshots with Regshot
  46. Faking a Network
  47. Packet Sniffing with Wireshark
  48. Using INetSim
  49. Basic Dynamic Tools in Practice
  50. Conclusion
  51. Labs
  52. II. Advanced Static Analysis
  53. 4. A Crash Course in x86 Disassembly
  54. Levels of Abstraction
  55. Reverse-Engineering
  56. The x86 Architecture
  57. Conclusion
  58. 5. IDA Pro
  59. Loading an Executable
  60. The IDA Pro Interface
  61. Using Cross-References
  62. Analyzing Functions
  63. Using Graphing Options
  64. Enhancing Disassembly
  65. Extending IDA with Plug-ins
  66. Conclusion
  67. Labs
  68. 6. Recognizing C Code Constructs in Assembly
  69. Global vs. Local Variables
  70. Disassembling Arithmetic Operations
  71. Recognizing if Statements
  72. Recognizing Loops
  73. Understanding Function Call Conventions
  74. Analyzing switch Statements
  75. Disassembling Arrays
  76. Identifying Structs
  77. Analyzing Linked List Traversal
  78. Conclusion
  79. Labs
  80. 7. Analyzing Malicious Windows Programs
  81. The Windows API
  82. The Windows Registry
  83. Networking APIs
  84. Following Running Malware
  85. Kernel vs. User Mode
  86. The Native API
  87. Conclusion
  88. Labs
  89. III. Advanced Dynamic Analysis
  90. 8. Debugging
  91. Source-Level vs. Assembly-Level Debuggers
  92. Kernel vs. User-Mode Debugging
  93. Using a Debugger
  94. Exceptions
  95. Modifying Execution with a Debugger
  96. Modifying Program Execution in Practice
  97. Conclusion
  98. 9. OllyDbg
  99. Loading Malware
  100. The OllyDbg Interface
  101. Memory Map
  102. Viewing Threads and Stacks
  103. Executing Code
  104. Breakpoints
  105. Loading DLLs
  106. Tracing
  107. Exception Handling
  108. Patching
  109. Analyzing Shellcode
  110. Assistance Features
  111. Plug-ins
  112. Scriptable Debugging
  113. Conclusion
  114. Labs
  115. 10. Kernel Debugging with WinDbg
  116. Drivers and Kernel Code
  117. Setting Up Kernel Debugging
  118. Using WinDbg
  119. Microsoft Symbols
  120. Kernel Debugging in Practice
  121. Rootkits
  122. Loading Drivers
  123. Kernel Issues for Windows Vista, Windows 7, and x64 Versions
  124. Conclusion
  125. Labs
  126. IV. Malware Functionality
  127. 11. Malware Behavior
  128. Downloaders and Launchers
  129. Backdoors
  130. Credential Stealers
  131. Persistence Mechanisms
  132. Privilege Escalation
  133. Covering Its Tracks—User-Mode Rootkits
  134. Conclusion
  135. Labs
  136. 12. Covert Malware Launching
  137. Launchers
  138. Process Injection
  139. Process Replacement
  140. Hook Injection
  141. Detours
  142. APC Injection
  143. Conclusion
  144. Labs
  145. 13. Data Encoding
  146. The Goal of Analyzing Encoding Algorithms
  147. Simple Ciphers
  148. Common Cryptographic Algorithms
  149. Custom Encoding
  150. Decoding
  151. Conclusion
  152. Labs
  153. 14. Malware-Focused Network Signatures
  154. Network Countermeasures
  155. Safely Investigate an Attacker Online
  156. Content-Based Network Countermeasures
  157. Combining Dynamic and Static Analysis Techniques
  158. Understanding the Attacker’s Perspective
  159. Conclusion
  160. Labs
  161. V. Anti-Reverse-Engineering
  162. 15. Anti-Disassembly
  163. Understanding Anti-Disassembly
  164. Defeating Disassembly Algorithms
  165. Anti-Disassembly Techniques
  166. Obscuring Flow Control
  167. Thwarting Stack-Frame Analysis
  168. Conclusion
  169. Labs
  170. 16. Anti-Debugging
  171. Windows Debugger Detection
  172. Identifying Debugger Behavior
  173. Interfering with Debugger Functionality
  174. Debugger Vulnerabilities
  175. Conclusion
  176. Labs
  177. 17. Anti-Virtual Machine Techniques
  178. VMware Artifacts
  179. Vulnerable Instructions
  180. Tweaking Settings
  181. Escaping the Virtual Machine
  182. Conclusion
  183. Labs
  184. 18. Packers and Unpacking
  185. Packer Anatomy
  186. Identifying Packed Programs
  187. Unpacking Options
  188. Automated Unpacking
  189. Manual Unpacking
  190. Tips and Tricks for Common Packers
  191. Analyzing Without Fully Unpacking
  192. Packed DLLs
  193. Conclusion
  194. Labs
  195. VI. Special Topics
  196. 19. Shellcode Analysis
  197. Loading Shellcode for Analysis
  198. Position-Independent Code
  199. Identifying Execution Location
  200. Manual Symbol Resolution
  201. A Full Hello World Example
  202. Shellcode Encodings
  203. NOP Sleds
  204. Finding Shellcode
  205. Conclusion
  206. Labs
  207. 20. C++ Analysis
  208. Object-Oriented Programming
  209. Virtual vs. Nonvirtual Functions
  210. Creating and Destroying Objects
  211. Conclusion
  212. Labs
  213. 21. 64-Bit Malware
  214. Why 64-Bit Malware?
  215. Differences in x64 Architecture
  216. Windows 32-Bit on Windows 64-Bit
  217. 64-Bit Hints at Malware Functionality
  218. Conclusion
  219. Labs
  220. A. Important Windows Functions
  221. B. Tools for Malware Analysis
  222. C. Solutions to Labs
  223. Lab 1-1 Solutions
  224. Lab 1-2 Solutions
  225. Lab 1-3 Solutions
  226. Lab 1-4 Solutions
  227. Lab 3-1 Solutions
  228. Lab 3-2 Solutions
  229. Lab 3-3 Solutions
  230. Lab 3-4 Solutions
  231. Lab 5-1 Solutions
  232. Lab 6-1 Solutions
  233. Lab 6-2 Solutions
  234. Lab 6-3 Solutions
  235. Lab 6-4 Solutions
  236. Lab 7-1 Solutions
  237. Lab 7-2 Solutions
  238. Lab 7-3 Solutions
  239. Lab 9-1 Solutions
  240. Lab 9-2 Solutions
  241. Lab 9-3 Solutions
  242. Lab 10-1 Solutions
  243. Lab 10-2 Solutions
  244. Lab 10-3 Solutions
  245. Lab 11-1 Solutions
  246. Lab 11-2 Solutions
  247. Lab 11-3 Solutions
  248. Lab 12-1 Solutions
  249. Lab 12-2 Solutions
  250. Lab 12-3 Solutions
  251. Lab 12-4 Solutions
  252. Lab 13-1 Solutions
  253. Lab 13-2 Solutions
  254. Lab 13-3 Solutions
  255. Lab 14-1 Solutions
  256. Lab 14-2 Solutions
  257. Lab 14-3 Solutions
  258. Lab 15-1 Solutions
  259. Lab 15-2 Solutions
  260. Lab 15-3 Solutions
  261. Lab 16-1 Solutions
  262. Lab 16-2 Solutions
  263. Lab 16-3 Solutions
  264. Lab 17-1 Solutions
  265. Lab 17-2 Solutions
  266. Lab 17-3 Solutions
  267. Lab 18-1 Solutions
  268. Lab 18-2 Solutions
  269. Lab 18-3 Solutions
  270. Lab 18-4 Solutions
  271. Lab 18-5 Solutions
  272. Lab 19-1 Solutions
  273. Lab 19-2 Solutions
  274. Lab 19-3 Solutions
  275. Lab 20-1 Solutions
  276. Lab 20-2 Solutions
  277. Lab 20-3 Solutions
  278. Lab 21-1 Solutions
  279. Lab 21-2 Solutions
  280. Index
  281. Index
  282. Index
  283. Index
  284. Index
  285. Index
  286. Index
  287. Index
  288. Index
  289. Index
  290. Index
  291. Index
  292. Index
  293. Index
  294. Index
  295. Index
  296. Index
  297. Index
  298. Index
  299. Index
  300. Index
  301. Index
  302. Index
  303. Index
  304. Index
  305. Index
  306. Index
  307. Updates
  308. About the Authors
  309. Copyright

Hook Injection

Hook injection describes a way to load malware that takes advantage of Windows hooks, which are used to intercept messages destined for applications. Malware authors can use hook injection to accomplish two things:

  • To be sure that malicious code will run whenever a particular message is intercepted

  • To be sure that a particular DLL will be loaded in a victim process’s memory space

As shown in Figure 12-3, users generate events that are sent to the OS, which then sends messages created by those events to threads registered to receive them. The right side of the figure shows one way that an attacker can insert a malicious DLL to intercept messages.

Event and message flow in Windows with and without hook injection

Figure 12-3. Event and message flow in Windows with and without hook injection

Local and Remote Hooks

There are two types of Windows hooks:

  • Local hooks are used to observe or manipulate messages destined for an internal process.

  • Remote hooks are used to observe or manipulate messages destined for a remote process (another process on the system).

Remote hooks are available in two forms: high and low level. High-level remote hooks require that the hook procedure be an exported function contained in a DLL, which will be mapped by the OS into the process space of a hooked thread or all threads. Low-level remote hooks require that the hook procedure be contained in the process that installed the hook. This procedure is notified before the OS gets a chance to process the event.

Keyloggers Using Hooks

Hook injection is frequently used in malicious applications known as keyloggers, which record keystrokes. Keystrokes can be captured by registering high- or low-level hooks using the WH_KEYBOARD or WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook procedure types, respectively.

For WH_KEYBOARD procedures, the hook will often be running in the context of a remote process, but it can also run in the process that installed the hook. For WH_KEYBOARD_LL procedures, the events are sent directly to the process that installed the hook, so the hook will be running in the context of the process that created it. Using either hook type, a keylogger can intercept keystrokes and log them to a file or alter them before passing them along to the process or system.

Using SetWindowsHookEx

The principal function call used to perform remote Windows hooking is SetWindowsHookEx, which has the following parameters:

  • idHook. Specifies the type of hook procedure to install.

  • lpfn. Points to the hook procedure.

  • hMod. For high-level hooks, identifies the handle to the DLL containing the hook procedure defined by lpfn. For low-level hooks, this identifies the local module in which the lpfn procedure is defined.

  • dwThreadId. Specifies the identifier of the thread with which the hook procedure is to be associated. If this parameter is zero, the hook procedure is associated with all existing threads running in the same desktop as the calling thread. This must be set to zero for low-level hooks.

The hook procedure can contain code to process messages as they come in from the system, or it can do nothing. Either way, the hook procedure must call CallNextHookEx, which ensures that the next hook procedure in the call chain gets the message and that the system continues to run properly.

Thread Targeting

When targeting a specific dwThreadId, malware generally includes instructions for determining which system thread identifier to use, or it is designed to load into all threads. That said, malware will load into all threads only if it’s a keylogger or the equivalent (when the goal is message interception). However, loading into all threads can degrade the running system and may trigger an IPS. Therefore, if the goal is to simply load a DLL in a remote process, only a single thread will be injected in order to remain stealthy.

Targeting a single thread requires a search of the process listing for the target process and can require that the malware run a program if the target process is not already running. If a malicious application hooks a Windows message that is used frequently, it’s more likely to trigger an IPS, so malware will often set a hook with a message that is not often used, such as WH_CBT (a computer-based training message).

Example 12-4 shows the assembly code for performing hook injection in order to load a DLL in a different process’s memory space.

Example 12-4. Hook injection, assembly code

00401100        push    esi
00401101        push    edi
00401102        push    offset LibFileName ; "hook.dll"
00401107        call    LoadLibraryA
0040110D        mov     esi, eax
0040110F        push    offset ProcName ; "MalwareProc"
00401114        push    esi             ; hModule
00401115        call    GetProcAddress
0040111B        mov     edi, eax
0040111D        call    GetNotepadThreadId
00401122        push    eax             ; dwThreadId
00401123        push    esi             ; hmod
00401124        push    edi             ; lpfn
00401125        push    WH_CBT   ; idHook
00401127        call    SetWindowsHookExA

In Example 12-4, the malicious DLL (hook.dll) is loaded by the malware, and the malicious hook procedure address is obtained. The hook procedure, MalwareProc, calls only CallNextHookEx. SetWindowsHookEx is then called for a thread in notepad.exe (assuming that notepad.exe is running). GetNotepadThreadId is a locally defined function that obtains a dwThreadId for notepad.exe. Finally, a WH_CBT message is sent to the injected notepad.exe in order to force hook.dll to be loaded by notepad.exe. This allows hook.dll to run in the notepad.exe process space.

Once hook.dll is injected, it can execute the full malicious code stored in DllMain, while disguised as the notepad.exe process. Since MalwareProc calls only CallNextHookEx, it should not interfere with incoming messages, but malware often immediately calls LoadLibrary and UnhookWindowsHookEx in DllMain to ensure that incoming messages are not impacted.