Table of Contents for
Practical Malware Analysis

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical Malware Analysis by Andrew Honig Published by No Starch Press, 2012
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Malware Analysis: The Hands-On Guide to Dissecting Malicious Software
  3. Praise for Practical Malware Analysis
  4. Warning
  5. About the Authors
  6. About the Technical Reviewer
  7. About the Contributing Authors
  8. Foreword
  9. Acknowledgments
  10. Individual Thanks
  11. Introduction
  12. What Is Malware Analysis?
  13. Prerequisites
  14. Practical, Hands-On Learning
  15. What’s in the Book?
  16. 0. Malware Analysis Primer
  17. The Goals of Malware Analysis
  18. Malware Analysis Techniques
  19. Types of Malware
  20. General Rules for Malware Analysis
  21. I. Basic Analysis
  22. 1. Basic Static Techniques
  23. Antivirus Scanning: A Useful First Step
  24. Hashing: A Fingerprint for Malware
  25. Finding Strings
  26. Packed and Obfuscated Malware
  27. Portable Executable File Format
  28. Linked Libraries and Functions
  29. Static Analysis in Practice
  30. The PE File Headers and Sections
  31. Conclusion
  32. Labs
  33. 2. Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines
  34. The Structure of a Virtual Machine
  35. Creating Your Malware Analysis Machine
  36. Using Your Malware Analysis Machine
  37. The Risks of Using VMware for Malware Analysis
  38. Record/Replay: Running Your Computer in Reverse
  39. Conclusion
  40. 3. Basic Dynamic Analysis
  41. Sandboxes: The Quick-and-Dirty Approach
  42. Running Malware
  43. Monitoring with Process Monitor
  44. Viewing Processes with Process Explorer
  45. Comparing Registry Snapshots with Regshot
  46. Faking a Network
  47. Packet Sniffing with Wireshark
  48. Using INetSim
  49. Basic Dynamic Tools in Practice
  50. Conclusion
  51. Labs
  52. II. Advanced Static Analysis
  53. 4. A Crash Course in x86 Disassembly
  54. Levels of Abstraction
  55. Reverse-Engineering
  56. The x86 Architecture
  57. Conclusion
  58. 5. IDA Pro
  59. Loading an Executable
  60. The IDA Pro Interface
  61. Using Cross-References
  62. Analyzing Functions
  63. Using Graphing Options
  64. Enhancing Disassembly
  65. Extending IDA with Plug-ins
  66. Conclusion
  67. Labs
  68. 6. Recognizing C Code Constructs in Assembly
  69. Global vs. Local Variables
  70. Disassembling Arithmetic Operations
  71. Recognizing if Statements
  72. Recognizing Loops
  73. Understanding Function Call Conventions
  74. Analyzing switch Statements
  75. Disassembling Arrays
  76. Identifying Structs
  77. Analyzing Linked List Traversal
  78. Conclusion
  79. Labs
  80. 7. Analyzing Malicious Windows Programs
  81. The Windows API
  82. The Windows Registry
  83. Networking APIs
  84. Following Running Malware
  85. Kernel vs. User Mode
  86. The Native API
  87. Conclusion
  88. Labs
  89. III. Advanced Dynamic Analysis
  90. 8. Debugging
  91. Source-Level vs. Assembly-Level Debuggers
  92. Kernel vs. User-Mode Debugging
  93. Using a Debugger
  94. Exceptions
  95. Modifying Execution with a Debugger
  96. Modifying Program Execution in Practice
  97. Conclusion
  98. 9. OllyDbg
  99. Loading Malware
  100. The OllyDbg Interface
  101. Memory Map
  102. Viewing Threads and Stacks
  103. Executing Code
  104. Breakpoints
  105. Loading DLLs
  106. Tracing
  107. Exception Handling
  108. Patching
  109. Analyzing Shellcode
  110. Assistance Features
  111. Plug-ins
  112. Scriptable Debugging
  113. Conclusion
  114. Labs
  115. 10. Kernel Debugging with WinDbg
  116. Drivers and Kernel Code
  117. Setting Up Kernel Debugging
  118. Using WinDbg
  119. Microsoft Symbols
  120. Kernel Debugging in Practice
  121. Rootkits
  122. Loading Drivers
  123. Kernel Issues for Windows Vista, Windows 7, and x64 Versions
  124. Conclusion
  125. Labs
  126. IV. Malware Functionality
  127. 11. Malware Behavior
  128. Downloaders and Launchers
  129. Backdoors
  130. Credential Stealers
  131. Persistence Mechanisms
  132. Privilege Escalation
  133. Covering Its Tracks—User-Mode Rootkits
  134. Conclusion
  135. Labs
  136. 12. Covert Malware Launching
  137. Launchers
  138. Process Injection
  139. Process Replacement
  140. Hook Injection
  141. Detours
  142. APC Injection
  143. Conclusion
  144. Labs
  145. 13. Data Encoding
  146. The Goal of Analyzing Encoding Algorithms
  147. Simple Ciphers
  148. Common Cryptographic Algorithms
  149. Custom Encoding
  150. Decoding
  151. Conclusion
  152. Labs
  153. 14. Malware-Focused Network Signatures
  154. Network Countermeasures
  155. Safely Investigate an Attacker Online
  156. Content-Based Network Countermeasures
  157. Combining Dynamic and Static Analysis Techniques
  158. Understanding the Attacker’s Perspective
  159. Conclusion
  160. Labs
  161. V. Anti-Reverse-Engineering
  162. 15. Anti-Disassembly
  163. Understanding Anti-Disassembly
  164. Defeating Disassembly Algorithms
  165. Anti-Disassembly Techniques
  166. Obscuring Flow Control
  167. Thwarting Stack-Frame Analysis
  168. Conclusion
  169. Labs
  170. 16. Anti-Debugging
  171. Windows Debugger Detection
  172. Identifying Debugger Behavior
  173. Interfering with Debugger Functionality
  174. Debugger Vulnerabilities
  175. Conclusion
  176. Labs
  177. 17. Anti-Virtual Machine Techniques
  178. VMware Artifacts
  179. Vulnerable Instructions
  180. Tweaking Settings
  181. Escaping the Virtual Machine
  182. Conclusion
  183. Labs
  184. 18. Packers and Unpacking
  185. Packer Anatomy
  186. Identifying Packed Programs
  187. Unpacking Options
  188. Automated Unpacking
  189. Manual Unpacking
  190. Tips and Tricks for Common Packers
  191. Analyzing Without Fully Unpacking
  192. Packed DLLs
  193. Conclusion
  194. Labs
  195. VI. Special Topics
  196. 19. Shellcode Analysis
  197. Loading Shellcode for Analysis
  198. Position-Independent Code
  199. Identifying Execution Location
  200. Manual Symbol Resolution
  201. A Full Hello World Example
  202. Shellcode Encodings
  203. NOP Sleds
  204. Finding Shellcode
  205. Conclusion
  206. Labs
  207. 20. C++ Analysis
  208. Object-Oriented Programming
  209. Virtual vs. Nonvirtual Functions
  210. Creating and Destroying Objects
  211. Conclusion
  212. Labs
  213. 21. 64-Bit Malware
  214. Why 64-Bit Malware?
  215. Differences in x64 Architecture
  216. Windows 32-Bit on Windows 64-Bit
  217. 64-Bit Hints at Malware Functionality
  218. Conclusion
  219. Labs
  220. A. Important Windows Functions
  221. B. Tools for Malware Analysis
  222. C. Solutions to Labs
  223. Lab 1-1 Solutions
  224. Lab 1-2 Solutions
  225. Lab 1-3 Solutions
  226. Lab 1-4 Solutions
  227. Lab 3-1 Solutions
  228. Lab 3-2 Solutions
  229. Lab 3-3 Solutions
  230. Lab 3-4 Solutions
  231. Lab 5-1 Solutions
  232. Lab 6-1 Solutions
  233. Lab 6-2 Solutions
  234. Lab 6-3 Solutions
  235. Lab 6-4 Solutions
  236. Lab 7-1 Solutions
  237. Lab 7-2 Solutions
  238. Lab 7-3 Solutions
  239. Lab 9-1 Solutions
  240. Lab 9-2 Solutions
  241. Lab 9-3 Solutions
  242. Lab 10-1 Solutions
  243. Lab 10-2 Solutions
  244. Lab 10-3 Solutions
  245. Lab 11-1 Solutions
  246. Lab 11-2 Solutions
  247. Lab 11-3 Solutions
  248. Lab 12-1 Solutions
  249. Lab 12-2 Solutions
  250. Lab 12-3 Solutions
  251. Lab 12-4 Solutions
  252. Lab 13-1 Solutions
  253. Lab 13-2 Solutions
  254. Lab 13-3 Solutions
  255. Lab 14-1 Solutions
  256. Lab 14-2 Solutions
  257. Lab 14-3 Solutions
  258. Lab 15-1 Solutions
  259. Lab 15-2 Solutions
  260. Lab 15-3 Solutions
  261. Lab 16-1 Solutions
  262. Lab 16-2 Solutions
  263. Lab 16-3 Solutions
  264. Lab 17-1 Solutions
  265. Lab 17-2 Solutions
  266. Lab 17-3 Solutions
  267. Lab 18-1 Solutions
  268. Lab 18-2 Solutions
  269. Lab 18-3 Solutions
  270. Lab 18-4 Solutions
  271. Lab 18-5 Solutions
  272. Lab 19-1 Solutions
  273. Lab 19-2 Solutions
  274. Lab 19-3 Solutions
  275. Lab 20-1 Solutions
  276. Lab 20-2 Solutions
  277. Lab 20-3 Solutions
  278. Lab 21-1 Solutions
  279. Lab 21-2 Solutions
  280. Index
  281. Index
  282. Index
  283. Index
  284. Index
  285. Index
  286. Index
  287. Index
  288. Index
  289. Index
  290. Index
  291. Index
  292. Index
  293. Index
  294. Index
  295. Index
  296. Index
  297. Index
  298. Index
  299. Index
  300. Index
  301. Index
  302. Index
  303. Index
  304. Index
  305. Index
  306. Index
  307. Updates
  308. About the Authors
  309. Copyright

Manual Symbol Resolution

Shellcode exists as a binary blob that gains execution. It must do something useful once it gains execution, which usually means interacting with the system through APIs.

Remember that shellcode cannot use the Windows loader to ensure that all required libraries are loaded and available, and to make sure that all external symbols are resolved. Instead, it must find the symbols itself. The shellcode in the previous examples used hard-coded addresses to find the symbols, but this very fragile method will work only on a specific version of an OS and service pack. Shellcode must dynamically locate the functions in order to work reliably in different environments, and for that task, it typically uses LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress.

LoadLibraryA loads the specified library and returns a handle. The GetProcAddress function searches the library’s exports for the given symbol name or ordinal number. If shellcode has access to these two functions, it can load any library on the system and find exported symbols, at which point it has full access to the API.

Both functions are exported from kernel32.dll, so the shellcode must do the following:

  • Find kernel32.dll in memory.

  • Parse kernel32.dll’s PE file and search the exported functions for LoadLibraryA and GetProcAddress.

Finding kernel32.dll in Memory

In order to locate kernel32.dll, we’ll follow a series of undocumented Windows structures. One of these structures contains the load address of kernel32.dll.

Note

Most of the Windows structures are listed on the Microsoft Developer Network (MSDN) site, but they are not fully documented. Many contain byte arrays named Reserved, with the warning “This structure may be altered in future versions of Windows.” For full listings of these structures, see http://undocumented.ntinternals.net/.

Figure 19-1 shows the data structures that are typically followed in order to find the base address for kernel32.dll (only relevant fields and offsets within each structure are shown).

Structure traversal to find kernel32.dll DllBase

Figure 19-1. Structure traversal to find kernel32.dll DllBase

The process begins with the TEB, accessible from the FS segment register. Offset 0x30 within the TEB is the pointer to the PEB. Offset 0xc within the PEB is the pointer to the PEB_LDR_DATA structure, which contains three doubly linked lists of LDR_DATA_TABLE structures—one for each loaded module. The DllBase field in the kernel32.dll entry is the value we’re seeking.

Three LIST_ENTRY structures link the LDR_DATA_TABLE entries together in different orders, by name. The InInitializationOrderLinks entry is typically followed by shellcode. From Windows 2000 through Vista, kernel32.dll is the second DLL initialized, just after ntdll.dll, which means that the second entry in the InInitializationOrderLinks list of structures should belong to kernel32.dll. However, beginning with Windows 7, kernel32.dll is no longer the second module to be initialized, so this simple algorithm no longer works. Portable shellcode will instead need to examine the UNICODE_STRING FullDllName field to confirm it is kernel32.dll.

When traversing the LIST_ENTRY structures, it is important to realize that the Flink and Blink pointers point to the equivalent LIST_ENTRY in the next and previous LDR_DATA_TABLE structures. This means that when following the InInitializationOrderLinks to get to kernel32.dll’s LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY, you need to add only eight to the pointer to get the DllBase, instead of adding 0x18, which you would have to do if the pointer pointed to the start of the structure.

Example 19-4 contains sample assembly code that finds the base address of kernel32.dll.

Example 19-4. findKernel32Base implementation

; __stdcall DWORD findKernel32Base(void);
findKernel32Base:
    push    esi
    xor     eax, eax
    mov     eax, [fs:eax+0x30]   ; eax gets pointer to PEB
    test    eax, eax              ; if high bit set: Win9x
    js      .kernel32_9x 
    mov     eax, [eax + 0x0c]    ; eax gets pointer to PEB_LDR_DATA
    ;esi gets pointer to 1st
    ;LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.InInitializationOrderLinks.Flink
    mov     esi, [eax + 0x1c]
    ;eax gets pointer to 2nd
    ;LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.InInitializationOrderLinks.Flink
    lodsd 
    mov     eax, [eax + 8]        ; eax gets LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY.DllBase
    jmp     near .finished
.kernel32_9x:
    jmp     near .kernel32_9x    ; Win9x not supported: infinite loop
.finished:
    pop     esi
    ret

The listing accesses the TEB using the FS segment register at to get the pointer to the PEB. The js (jump if signed) instruction at is used to test whether the most significant bit of the PEB pointer is set, in order to differentiate between Win9x and WinNT systems. In WinNT (including Windows 2000, XP, and Vista), the most significant bit of the PEB pointer is typically never set, because high memory addresses are reserved for the OS. Using the sign bit to identify the OS family fails on systems that use the /3GB boot option, which causes the user-level/kernel-level memory split to occur at 0xC0000000 instead of 0x8000000, but this is ignored for this simple example. This shellcode chose not to support Win9x, so it enters an infinite loop at if Win9x is detected.

The shellcode proceeds to PEB_LDR_DATA at . It assumes that it is running under Windows Vista or earlier, so it can simply retrieve the second LDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY in the InInitializationOrderLinks linked list at and return its DllBase field.

Parsing PE Export Data

Once you find the base address for kernel32.dll, you must parse it to find exported symbols. As with finding the location of kernel32.dll, this process involves following several structures in memory.

PE files use relative virtual addresses (RVAs) when defining locations within a file. These addresses can be thought of as offsets within the PE image in memory, so the PE image base address must be added to each RVA to turn it into a valid pointer.

The export data is stored in IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY. An RVA to this is stored in the array of IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY structures at the end of the IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER. The location of the IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY array depends on whether the PE file is for a 32-bit application or a 64-bit application. Typical shellcode assumes it is running on a 32-bit platform, so it knows at compile time that the correct offset from the PE signature to the directory array is as follows:

sizeof(PE_Signature) + sizeof(IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) + sizeof(IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER) = 120 bytes

The relevant fields in the IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY structure are shown in Figure 19-2. AddressOfFunctions is an array of RVAs that points to the actual export functions. It is indexed by an export ordinal (an alternative way of finding an exported symbol).

The shellcode needs to map the export name to the ordinal in order to use this array, and it does so using the AddressOfNames and AddressOfNameOrdinals arrays. These two arrays exist in parallel. They have the same number of entries, and equivalent indices into these arrays are directly related. AddressOfNames is an array of 32-bit RVAs that point to the strings of symbol names. AddressOfNameOrdinals is an array of 16-bit ordinals. For a given index idx into these arrays, the symbol at AddressOfNames[idx] has the export ordinal value at AddressOfNameOrdinals[idx]. The AddressOfNames array is sorted alphabetically so that a binary search can quickly find a specific string, though most shellcode simply performs a linear search starting at the beginning of the array.

To find the export address of a symbol, follow these steps:

  1. Iterate over the AddressOfNames array looking at each char* entry, and perform a string comparison against the desired symbol until a match is found. Call this index into AddressOfNames iName.

  2. Index into the AddressOfNameOrdinals array using iName. The value retrieved is the value iOrdinal.

  3. Use iOrdinal to index into the AddressOfFunctions array. The value retrieved is the RVA of the exported symbol. Return this value to the requester.

A sample implementation of this algorithm is shown later in the chapter as part of a full Hello World example.

kernel32.dll IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY

Figure 19-2. kernel32.dll IMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY

Once the shellcode finds LoadLibraryA, it can load arbitrary libraries. The return value of LoadLibraryA is treated as a HANDLE in the Win32 API. Examining the HANDLE values shows that it is actually a 32-bit pointer to the dllBase of the library that was loaded, which means that the shellcode can skip using GetProcAddress and continue using its own PE parsing code with the dllBase pointers returned from LoadLibraryA (which is also beneficial when hashed names are used, as explained in the next section).

Using Hashed Exported Names

The algorithm just discussed has a weakness: It performs a strcmp against each export name until it finds the correct one. This requires that the full name of each API function the shellcode uses be included as an ASCII string. When the size of the shellcode is constrained, these strings could push the size of the shellcode over the limit.

A common way to address this problem is to calculate a hash of each symbol string and compare the result with a precomputed value stored in the shellcode. The hash function does not need to be sophisticated; it only needs to guarantee that within each DLL used by the shellcode, the hashes that the shellcode uses are unique. Hash collisions between symbols in different DLLs and between symbols the shellcode does not use are fine.

The most common hash function is the 32-bit rotate-right-additive hash, as shown in Example 19-5.

Example 19-5. hashString implementation

; __stdcall DWORD hashString(char* symbol);
hashString:
    push    esi
    push    edi
    mov     esi, dword [esp+0x0c]   ; load function argument in esi
.calc_hash:
    xor     edi, edi 
    cld
.hash_iter:
    xor     eax, eax
    lodsb                          ; load next byte of input string
    cmp     al, ah
    je      .hash_done              ; check if at end of symbol
    ror     edi, 0x0d              ; rotate right 13 (0x0d)
    add     edi, eax
    jmp     near .hash_iter
.hash_done:
    mov     eax, edi
    pop     edi
    pop     esi
    retn    4

This function calculates a 32-bit DWORD hash value of the string pointer argument. The EDI register is treated as the current hash value, and is initialized to zero at . Each byte of the input string is loaded via the lodsb instruction at . If the byte is not NULL, the current hash is rotated right by 13 (0x0d) at , and the current byte is added into the hash. This hash is returned in EAX so that its caller can compare the result with the value compiled into the code.

Note

The particular algorithm in Example 19-5 has become commonly used due to its inclusion in Metasploit, but variations that use different rotation amounts and hash sizes are sometimes seen.