Table of Contents for
Practical UNIX and Internet Security, 3rd Edition

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical UNIX and Internet Security, 3rd Edition by Alan Schwartz Published by O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2003
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Unix & Internet Security, 3rd Edition
  3. A Note Regarding Supplemental Files
  4. Preface
  5. Unix “Security”?
  6. Scope of This Book
  7. Which Unix System?
  8. Conventions Used in This Book
  9. Comments and Questions
  10. Acknowledgments
  11. A Note to Would-Be Attackers
  12. I. Computer Security Basics
  13. 1. Introduction: Some Fundamental Questions
  14. What Is Computer Security?
  15. What Is an Operating System?
  16. What Is a Deployment Environment?
  17. Summary
  18. 2. Unix History and Lineage
  19. History of Unix
  20. Security and Unix
  21. Role of This Book
  22. Summary
  23. 3. Policies and Guidelines
  24. Planning Your Security Needs
  25. Risk Assessment
  26. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Best Practices
  27. Policy
  28. Compliance Audits
  29. Outsourcing Options
  30. The Problem with Security Through Obscurity
  31. Summary
  32. II. Security Building Blocks
  33. 4. Users, Passwords, and Authentication
  34. Logging in with Usernames and Passwords
  35. The Care and Feeding of Passwords
  36. How Unix Implements Passwords
  37. Network Account and Authorization Systems
  38. Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
  39. Summary
  40. 5. Users, Groups, and the Superuser
  41. Users and Groups
  42. The Superuser (root)
  43. The su Command: Changing Who You Claim to Be
  44. Restrictions on the Superuser
  45. Summary
  46. 6. Filesystems and Security
  47. Understanding Filesystems
  48. File Attributes and Permissions
  49. chmod: Changing a File’s Permissions
  50. The umask
  51. SUID and SGID
  52. Device Files
  53. Changing a File’s Owner or Group
  54. Summary
  55. 7. Cryptography Basics
  56. Understanding Cryptography
  57. Symmetric Key Algorithms
  58. Public Key Algorithms
  59. Message Digest Functions
  60. Summary
  61. 8. Physical Security for Servers
  62. Planning for the Forgotten Threats
  63. Protecting Computer Hardware
  64. Preventing Theft
  65. Protecting Your Data
  66. Story: A Failed Site Inspection
  67. Summary
  68. 9. Personnel Security
  69. Background Checks
  70. On the Job
  71. Departure
  72. Other People
  73. Summary
  74. III. Network and Internet Security
  75. 10. Modems and Dialup Security
  76. Modems: Theory of Operation
  77. Modems and Security
  78. Modems and Unix
  79. Additional Security for Modems
  80. Summary
  81. 11. TCP/IP Networks
  82. Networking
  83. IP: The Internet Protocol
  84. IP Security
  85. Summary
  86. 12. Securing TCP and UDP Services
  87. Understanding Unix Internet Servers and Services
  88. Controlling Access to Servers
  89. Primary Unix Network Services
  90. Managing Services Securely
  91. Putting It All Together: An Example
  92. Summary
  93. 13. Sun RPC
  94. Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
  95. Secure RPC (AUTH_DES)
  96. Summary
  97. 14. Network-Based Authentication Systems
  98. Sun’s Network Information Service (NIS)
  99. Sun’s NIS+
  100. Kerberos
  101. LDAP
  102. Other Network Authentication Systems
  103. Summary
  104. 15. Network Filesystems
  105. Understanding NFS
  106. Server-Side NFS Security
  107. Client-Side NFS Security
  108. Improving NFS Security
  109. Some Last Comments on NFS
  110. Understanding SMB
  111. Summary
  112. 16. Secure Programming Techniques
  113. One Bug Can Ruin Your Whole Day . . .
  114. Tips on Avoiding Security-Related Bugs
  115. Tips on Writing Network Programs
  116. Tips on Writing SUID/SGID Programs
  117. Using chroot( )
  118. Tips on Using Passwords
  119. Tips on Generating Random Numbers
  120. Summary
  121. IV. Secure Operations
  122. 17. Keeping Up to Date
  123. Software Management Systems
  124. Updating System Software
  125. Summary
  126. 18. Backups
  127. Why Make Backups?
  128. Backing Up System Files
  129. Software for Backups
  130. Summary
  131. 19. Defending Accounts
  132. Dangerous Accounts
  133. Monitoring File Format
  134. Restricting Logins
  135. Managing Dormant Accounts
  136. Protecting the root Account
  137. One-Time Passwords
  138. Administrative Techniques for Conventional Passwords
  139. Intrusion Detection Systems
  140. Summary
  141. 20. Integrity Management
  142. The Need for Integrity
  143. Protecting Integrity
  144. Detecting Changes After the Fact
  145. Integrity-Checking Tools
  146. Summary
  147. 21. Auditing, Logging, and Forensics
  148. Unix Log File Utilities
  149. Process Accounting: The acct/pacct File
  150. Program-Specific Log Files
  151. Designing a Site-Wide Log Policy
  152. Handwritten Logs
  153. Managing Log Files
  154. Unix Forensics
  155. Summary
  156. V. Handling Security Incidents
  157. 22. Discovering a Break-in
  158. Prelude
  159. Discovering an Intruder
  160. Cleaning Up After the Intruder
  161. Case Studies
  162. Summary
  163. 23. Protecting Against Programmed Threats
  164. Programmed Threats: Definitions
  165. Damage
  166. Authors
  167. Entry
  168. Protecting Yourself
  169. Preventing Attacks
  170. Summary
  171. 24. Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions
  172. Types of Attacks
  173. Destructive Attacks
  174. Overload Attacks
  175. Network Denial of Service Attacks
  176. Summary
  177. 25. Computer Crime
  178. Your Legal Options After a Break-in
  179. Criminal Hazards
  180. Criminal Subject Matter
  181. Summary
  182. 26. Who Do You Trust?
  183. Can You Trust Your Computer?
  184. Can You Trust Your Suppliers?
  185. Can You Trust People?
  186. Summary
  187. VI. Appendixes
  188. A. Unix Security Checklist
  189. Preface
  190. Chapter 1: Introduction: Some Fundamental Questions
  191. Chapter 2: Unix History and Lineage
  192. Chapter 3: Policies and Guidelines
  193. Chapter 4: Users, Passwords, and Authentication
  194. Chapter 5: Users, Groups, and the Superuser
  195. Chapter 6: Filesystems and Security
  196. Chapter 7: Cryptography Basics
  197. Chapter 8: Physical Security for Servers
  198. Chapter 9: Personnel Security
  199. Chapter 10: Modems and Dialup Security
  200. Chapter 11: TCP/IP Networks
  201. Chapter 12: Securing TCP and UDP Services
  202. Chapter 13: Sun RPC
  203. Chapter 14: Network-Based Authentication Systems
  204. Chapter 15: Network Filesystems
  205. Chapter 16: Secure Programming Techniques
  206. Chapter 17: Keeping Up to Date
  207. Chapter 18: Backups
  208. Chapter 19: Defending Accounts
  209. Chapter 20: Integrity Management
  210. Chapter 21: Auditing, Logging, and Forensics
  211. Chapter 22: Discovering a Break-In
  212. Chapter 23: Protecting Against Programmed Threats
  213. Chapter 24: Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions
  214. Chapter 25: Computer Crime
  215. Chapter 26: Who Do You Trust?
  216. Appendix A: Unix Security Checklist
  217. Appendix B: Unix Processes
  218. Appendixes C, D, and E: Paper Sources, Electronic Sources, and Organizations
  219. B. Unix Processes
  220. About Processes
  221. Signals
  222. Controlling and Examining Processes
  223. Starting Up Unix and Logging In
  224. C. Paper Sources
  225. Unix Security References
  226. Other Computer References
  227. D. Electronic Resources
  228. Mailing Lists
  229. Web Sites
  230. Usenet Groups
  231. Software Resources
  232. E. Organizations
  233. Professional Organizations
  234. U.S. Government Organizations
  235. Emergency Response Organizations
  236. Index
  237. Index
  238. Index
  239. Index
  240. Index
  241. Index
  242. Index
  243. Index
  244. Index
  245. Index
  246. Index
  247. Index
  248. Index
  249. Index
  250. Index
  251. Index
  252. Index
  253. Index
  254. Index
  255. Index
  256. Index
  257. Index
  258. Index
  259. Index
  260. Index
  261. Index
  262. Index
  263. About the Authors
  264. Colophon
  265. Copyright

Criminal Hazards

If you operate an Internet Service Provider or web site, or have networked computers on your premises, you may be at risk for criminal prosecution yourself if those machines are misused. This section is designed to acquaint you with some of the risks.

If law enforcement officials believe that your computer system has been used by an employee to break into other computer systems, transmit or store controlled information (trade secrets, child pornography, etc.), or otherwise participate in some computer crime, you may find your computers impounded by a search warrant (in criminal cases) or writ of seizure (in civil cases). If you can document that your employee has had limited access to your systems, and if you present that information during the search, it may help limit the scope of the confiscation. However, you may still be in a position in which some of your equipment is confiscated as part of a legal search.

Local police or federal authorities can present a judge with a petition to grant a search warrant if they believe there is evidence to be found concerning a violation of a law. If the petition is in order, the judge will almost always grant the search warrant. In the recent past, a few federal investigators and law enforcement personnel in some states developed a reputation for heavy-handed and excessively broad searches. In part, this was because of inexperience with computer crime. It has been getting better with time.

The scope of each search warrant is usually detailed by the agent in charge and approved by the judge; some warrants are derived from “boilerplate” examples that are themselves too broad. These problems have resulted in considerable ill will, and in the future might result in evidence not being admissible on constitutional grounds because a search was too wide-ranging. How to define the proper scope of a search is an evolving discussion in the courts.

In the past, the first reaction of police investigating a crime has been to confiscate anything connected with the computer that may contain evidence (e.g., files with stolen source code or telephone access codes). This confiscation frequently resulted in the seizure of computers, all magnetic media that could be used with the computer, anything that could be used as an external storage peripheral (e.g., videotape machines and tapes), autodialers that could contain phone numbers for target systems in their battery-backed memory, and all documentation and printouts. In past investigations even laser printers, answering machines, and televisions have been seized by federal agents—sometimes apparently with reason, other times as a result of confusion on the part of the agents, and sometimes apparently out of spite.

Officers are required to give a receipt for what they take. However, you may wait a very long time before you get your equipment back, especially if there is a lot of storage media involved, or if the officers are not sure what they are looking for. Your equipment may not even be returned in working condition—batteries discharge, media degrades, and dust works its way into moving parts. Equipment can also be damaged in transport or as a result of the investigation.

You should discuss the return of your equipment during the execution of the warrant, or thereafter with the prosecutors. Indicate priorities and reasons for the items to be returned. In most cases, you can request copies of critical data and programs. As the owner of the equipment, you can also file suit to have it returned,[355] but such suits can drag on and may not be productive. Suits to recover damages may not be allowed against law enforcement agencies that are pursuing a legitimate investigation.

You can also challenge the reasons used to file the warrant and seek to have it declared invalid, forcing the return of your equipment. However, warrants are frequently sealed to protect ongoing investigations and informants, so this option can be difficult to execute. Equipment and media seized during a search may be held until a trial if they contain material to be used as prosecution evidence. Some state laws require forfeiture of the equipment in the event of a conviction—especially if drug crimes are involved.

Currently, a search is not likely to involve confiscation of a mainframe or even a minicomputer. However, confiscation of tapes, disks, and printed material could disable your business even if the computer itself is not taken. Having full backups offsite may not be sufficient protection because these tapes might also be taken by a search warrant if the police know of their location. If you think that a search might curtail your legitimate business, be sure that the agents conducting the search have detailed information regarding which records are vital to your ongoing operation, and request copies from them.

Until the law is better defined in this area, you should consult with an attorney if you are at all worried that a confiscation might occur. Furthermore, if you have homeowners or business insurance, check with your agent to see if it covers damages resulting from law enforcement agents during an investigation. Business interruption insurance provisions should also be checked if your business depends on your computer.



[355] If it is a federal warrant, your lawyer may file a Motion for Return of Property under Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.