IP Security

Throughout the last few decades, computers on the Internet have been subject to many different attacks:

Password-guessing attacks: With password-guessing attacks, attackers repeatedly try to guess user passwords.
Social-engineering attacks: With attacks of this kind, attackers send email or some other message in an attempt to get users to reveal their passwords or set the passwords to a new value specified by the attacker.
Server vulnerability attacks: With these, attackers exploit a flaw or undocumented command in a server and use the exploit to gain privileged access to the computer on which the server was running.

In the 1990s, the actual infrastructure of the Internet came under attack as well. (See Chapter 24 for more details.)

Network sniffers: Using network sniffers, attackers capture passwords and other sensitive pieces of information passing through the network as they are transmitted.
IP spoofing attacks: Attackers use such attacks to break into hosts on the Internet.
Connection hijacking: Connection hijacking is used by attackers to seize control of existing interactive sessions (e.g., telnet).
Data spoofing: Data spoofing is used by attackers on a rogue computer on a network to insert data into an ongoing communication between two other hosts. This type of attack has been demonstrated as an effective means of compromising the integrity of programs executed over the network from NFS servers.

In the first years of the 21st century, network security was complicated further still:

Denial-of-service attacks: DOS attacks have became much more common. Even when attackers could not gain access to the host, they could prevent it from doing anything useful for anyone else by overloading its CPU, hard drive, or network bandwidth.
Distributed denial-of-service attacks: DDOS attacks took denial of service to new levels by executing attacks on a host from dozens or hundreds of other hosts under the attacker’s control, making it difficult to defend against the attack by blocking traffic from a single-attack host.

Many of these attacks were anticipated years before they arose in the wild. Yet the IP protocols and the Internet itself are not well-protected against them. There are several reasons for this apparent failure:

IP is not sufficiently resilient to attack

IP was designed for use in a hostile environment, but its designers did not thoroughly appreciate how hostile the network itself might one day become.

IP was designed to allow computers to continue communicating after some communication lines had been cut. This concept is the genesis of packet communications: by using packets, you can route communications around points of failure. But the IP designers appear not to have anticipated wide-scale covert attacks from “legitimate” users. As a result, while IP is quite resilient when subjected to hardware failure, it is less resistant to purposeful attack.

IP was not designed to provide security

IP was designed to transmit packets from one computer to another. It was not designed to provide a system for authenticating hosts, or for allowing users to send communications on the network in absolute secrecy. For these purposes, IP’s creators assumed that other techniques would be used.

IP is an evolving protocol

IP is always improving. Future versions of IP may provide greater degrees of network security. However, IP is still, in many senses, an experimental protocol. It is being employed for uses for which it was never designed.

Today there are several techniques that have been used to add security to IP networks. Roughly in order of popularity, they are:

Using encryption to protect against eavesdropping.
Hardening operating systems and applications against attacks.
Physically isolating vulnerable systems from attackers.
Employing systems in the path of potentially hostile network traffic to screen connections to deny or redirect malicious traffic. These are known as firewalls.^[123]
Deploying advanced systems for authentication that do not rely on IP address or hostname.
Deploying decoy systems to detect attacks that are in progress and to distract attackers from more valuable systems.

Using Encryption to Protect IP Networks from Eavesdropping

IP is designed to get packets from one computer to another computer; the protocol makes no promise as to whether other computers on the same network will be able to intercept and read those packets in real time. Such interception is called eavesdropping or packet sniffing.

Different ways of transmitting packets have different susceptibility to eavesdropping. Table 11-4 lists several different network technologies and, for each, notes the eavesdropping potential.

Table 11-4. Eavesdropping potential for different data links

Network technology	Potential for eavesdropping	Comments
Ethernet and unswitched twisted-pair networks	High	Ethernet is a broadcast network. Many incidents of packet sniffing are made possible because multiple computers share the same Ethernet or are plugged into an unswitched 10BaseT or 100BaseT hub.
Switched twisted pair	Medium	Using an Ethernet switch can dramatically reduce the potential for eavesdropping. A switch is a special-purpose device that transmits packets only to the computers for which they are destined. However, it is still possible to monitor a switched network by programming the switch to create a mirror or monitor port, or to attack a switch to attempt to confuse its internal table associating computers and addresses.
FDDIToken-ring	High	Although ring networks are not inherently broadcast, in practice all packets that are transmitted on the ring pass through, on average, one-half of the interfaces that are on thenetwork.
Telephone lines	Medium	Telephones can be wiretapped by someone who has the cooperation of the telephone company or who has physical access to telephone lines. Calls that traverse microwave links can also be intercepted. In practice, high-speed modems are somewhat more difficult to wiretap than low-speed modems because of the many frequencies involved.
IP over cable TV	Medium	Most systems that have been developed for sending IP over cable TV rely on RF modems, which use one TV channel as an uplink and another TV channel as a downlink. Both packet streams can be intercepted by anyone who has physical access to the TV cable.
IP over power lines	High	Most systems that have been developed for sending IP over power lines treat the power line as a broadcast medium. In some cases, the power lines have been observed to act as RF antennas, and packets can be detected with a specially tuned radio.
Wireless networks, including microwave links and wireless LANs	High	Radio is inherently a broadcast medium. Anyone with a radio receiver can intercept your transmissions.

With most network technologies it is impossible to prevent or even detect eavesdropping. The only thing you can do is assume that your network traffic is in fact being eavesdropped and use encryption so that the recorded network traffic will not be useful to an attacker.

There are several places where encryption can be used to improve the security of IP networking protocols:^[124]

Link-level encryption

With link-level encryption, packets are automatically encrypted when they are transmitted over an unsecure data link and decrypted when they are received. Eavesdropping is defeated because an eavesdropper does not know how to decrypt packets that are intercepted. Link-level encryption is available on many radio-networking products, but is harder to find for other broadcast network technologies such as Ethernet or FDDI. Special link encryptors are available for modems and leased-line links.

End-to-end encryption

With end-to-end encryption, the host transmitting the packet encrypts the packet’s data; the packet’s contents are automatically decrypted when they are received at the other end. Some organizations that have more than one physical location use encrypting routers for connecting to the Internet. These routers automatically encrypt packets that are sent from one corporate location to the other to prevent eavesdropping by attackers on the Internet (these are known as VPNs); however, the routers do not encrypt packets that are sent from the organization to third-party sites on the network.

Today, this kind of packet-level encryption is typically implemented using the IPsec protocol (described in RFC 2401). IPsec can be used to transparently encrypt all communications between two hosts, between a host and a network, or between two networks. Using IPsec is a powerful way to automatically add encryption to systems that otherwise do not provide it.

Application-level encryption

Instead of relying on hardware to encrypt data, encryption can be done at the application level. For example, the Kerberos version of the telnet command can automatically encrypt the contents of the telnet data stream in both directions. The Secure Shell protocol (ssh) automatically provides for encryption of the data stream.

Application-level encryption can also be provided by tunneling or wrapping an existing application-level protocol using a second protocol. For example, the Secure Shell protocol provides for TCP/IP ports and connections to be “forwarded” from one host to another over a cryptographically-protected tunnel. Individual application servers and clients can also be wrapped using the SSL and TLS protocols.

These three encryption techniques are shown in Figure 11-9.

Figure 11-9. Three types of encryption for communication

Simply using encryption is not enough: the encryption must be properly implemented for it to provide protection. For example, the original encryption standard for 802.11(b) wireless LANs was named WEP, an acronym that stood for “Wired Equivalent Privacy.” But despite using encryption, WEP does not provide any true privacy at all: the encryption implementation is flawed, and it is trivial to determine the encryption keys used by WEP systems.

It is also the case that encryption only protects against eavesdropping. Many denial of service attacks can still succeed against hosts using encryption.

Hardening Against Attacks

Another way to protect networked computers is to harden the systems against network-based attacks. This process involves inspecting, testing, and frequently modifying the network stack, clients, and servers so that they are:

Resistant to nonstandard data, including malformed packets, nonsensical arguments, and implausible data
Resistant to attacks that attempt to exhaust limited resources
Resistant to sudden delays in interactive protocols

Although considerable hardening can be performed by inspection, hardening often comes only as a response to an attack that is demonstrated in the wild. Let’s look at three such attacks:

X Window attack

Early implementations of the X Window server would freeze for 30 seconds if an attacker opened a TCP/IP connection to port 6000 and sent no data.

The hardening fix was to modify the X server so that it did not block other clients while waiting for initial authentication data from new clients.

Ping of death

The so-called ping-of-death involved an ICMP Echo packet that contained 65,535 bytes. In the process of creating the corresponding ICMP Echo reply packet, many operating systems failed.^[125]

The hardening fix was to fix the code so that internal buffers in the ICMP implementations would not overflow during ICMP Echo requests.

SYN flood attack

With the so-called SYN flood attack, an attacking machine transmitted thousands of TCP SYN packets to a target machine. Each SYN packet was sent with a randomly generated source address. The target machine attempted to open thousands of connections to those remote machines, and in the process filled up internal tables and could no longer accept legitimate incoming TCP/IP connections.

The hardening fix was to modify the TCP/IP stack so that, when the internal table was filled, entries in the table were randomly dropped. With the entry dropped, the new SYN packet could be serviced. If it were legitimate, the connection would proceed to completion. If it were not legitimate, there would be no problem: it too would be randomly dropped at some later point in time.

Note that all of these fixes require that someone understand the attack, understand an appropriate way to harden the system without causing unwanted side-effects, and correctly code the change. Because hardening fixes almost always require access to the source code, most fixes are beyond the typical user, who must instead rely on some distribution of patches to the current system. Getting authentic, working patches in a timely fashion is itself a security problem. We will address this problem in Chapter 17.

Firewalls and Physical Isolation

A common technique for protecting computers that are vulnerable to a network-based attack is to physically isolate them from networks that can contain attackers. For example, it is common practice in many organizations to protect Windows-based servers from attackers on the Internet using a network firewall to mediate all data sent between the Internet and the vulnerable machines.

In some high-security applications, even firewalls do not provide sufficient isolation. In these cases, the network that needs to be secure can be completely isolated, with no firewalls, modems, or other forms of remote access allowed.

Firewall design is a complex and evolving topic. For more information about firewalls, see the references in the appendices.

Improving Authentication

Most IP services do not provide a strong system for positive authentication. As a result, an attacker can transmit information and claim that it comes from another source.

The lack of positive authentication presents problems, especially for services such as DNS, electronic mail, and Netnews (Usenet). In all of these services, the recipient of a message, be it a machine or a person, is likely to take positive action based on the content of a message, whether or not the message sender is properly authenticated.

Authentication systems have been developed for each of these services. DNS supports the cryptographic signing of zone data and authentication between nameservers using a shared secret key, mail servers can authenticate valid senders against a database, and Usenet messages can be cryptographically signed with PGP. However, adoption of these systems has not been widespread to date. We’ll describe each in greater detail in the following sections.

Authentication and DNS

DNS was not designed to be a secure protocol. The protocol contains no means by which the information returned by a DNS query can be verified as correct or incorrect. Thus, if DNS tells you that a particular host has a particular IP address, there is no way that you can be certain that the information returned is correct.

Because IP addresses and hostnames were designed as a system for moving data, and not as a system for providing authentication, DNS was developed in the absence of requirements for security and authentication.

Unfortunately, hostnames and IP addresses are commonly used for authentication on the Internet. The Berkeley Unix “r” commands (rsh and rlogin) use the hostname for authentication. Many programs examine the IP address of an incoming TCP connection, perform a reverse lookup DNS operation, and trust that the resulting hostname is correct. More sophisticated programs perform a double reverse lookup, in which the network client performs an IP address lookup with the resulting hostname to see if the looked-up IP address matches the IP address of the incoming TCP connection.^[126]

An attacker has more trouble spoofing a double reverse lookup, but the possibility still exists. Some typical attacks on DNS are:

Client flooding: As DNS uses UDP, an attacker can easily flood the host with thousands of forged DNS responses. These can be constructed so as to appear to come from the DNS server. The client performing a DNS lookup will most likely accept the attacker’s response, rather than the legitimate response from the authentic nameserver.
Bogus nameserver cache poisoning: Some nameservers will cache any response that they receive, whether it was requested or not. You can load these nameservers with incorrect IP address translations as part of a response to some other request.
Rogue DNS servers: The fact that someone runs a nameserver on her machine doesn’t mean you can trust the results. By appropriately modifying the responses of a nameserver for one domain to respond to requests with inappropriate information, the maintainer of a real DNS server can taint the responses to clients.

Firewalls can provide some (small) degree of protection against a few DNS attacks. Nevertheless, the real safety relies on not using IP addresses or hostnames for authentication. This is now possible on a limited basis with DNS extensions for cryptographically signing DNS queries, responses, and zone files.

Authentication and email

By design, servers that implement the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) accept mail messages from any client on the Internet. These mail messages may contain any combination of senders and recipients. It is the duty of the SMTP server to deliver the message to local users or, if the destination mailboxes are not local, to send the message to the intended destination.

This design for SMTP worked well for many years, but in the early 1990s the open nature of SMTP was hijacked by individuals and organizations sending large amounts of bulk email for commercial and political purposes. Such mail, sometimes called spam, is a growing problem for Internet users and providers alike. According to some estimates, between 50% and 90% of the email now traveling on the Internet is spam.

Spam exists because the SMTP protocol has not historically had strong authentication for the senders of messages. If the sender of each message were authenticated, then unwanted mail could be blocked by refusing email from senders who had a history of sending spam. As the sender is not usually authenticated, people who send spam can change in the From: header at will. As a result, blacklisting “known spammers” has not proven to be an effective anti-spam solution.^[127]

¡April Fools! authentication and Netnews

Netnews messages also lack sender authentication. In part, this is because Netnews messages are essentially email sent to special network-based message archives.

One of the best-known cases of a fraudulently published Netnews message appears below. It was not, in fact, written by Gene Spafford; instead, it was created and posted to the Usenet by his friend, Chuq von Rospach.

Path:purdue!umd5!ames!mailrus!umix!uunet!seismo!sundc!pitstop!sun!moscvax!perdue!spaf
From: spaf@cs.purdue.EDU (Gene Spafford)
Newsgroups: news.announce.important
Subject: Warning: April Fools Time again (forged messages on loose)
Message-ID: <35111-F@medusa.cs.purdue.edu>
Date: 1 Apr 88 00:00:00 GMT
Expires: 1 May 88 00:00:00 GMT
Followup-To: news.admin
Organization: Dept. of Computer Sciences, Purdue Univ.
Lines: 25
Approved: spaf@cs.purdue.EDU

Warning: April 1 is rapidly approaching, and with it comes a USENET
tradition. On April Fools day comes a series of forged, tongue-in-cheek
messages, either from non-existent sites or using the name of a Well
Known USENET person. In general, these messages are harmless and meant
as a joke, and people who respond to these messages without thinking,
either by flaming or otherwise responding, generally end up looking
rather silly when the forgery is exposed. 

So, for the next couple of weeks, if you see a message that seems
completely out of line or is otherwise unusual, think twice before
posting a followup or responding to it; it's very likely a forgery.

There are a few ways of checking to see if a message is a forgery.
These aren't foolproof, but since most forgery posters want people to
figure it out, they will allow you to track down the vast majority of
forgeries:

* Russian computers. For historic reasons most forged messages
have as part of their Path: a non-existent (we think!) russian
computer, either kremvax or moscvax. Other possibilities are nsacyber
or wobegon. Please note, however, that walldrug is a real site and
isn't a forgery.

* Posted dates. Almost invariably, the date of the posting is forged
to be April 1. 

* Funky Message-ID. Subtle hints are often lodged into the
Message-Id, as that field is more or less an unparsed text string and
can contain random information. Common values include pi, the phone
number of the red phone in the white house, and the name of the
forger's parrot.

* Subtle mispellings. Look for subtle misspellings of the host names
in the Path: field when a message is forged in the name of a Big Name
USENET person. This is done so that the person being forged actually
gets a chance to see the message and wonder when he actually posted it.

Forged messages, of course, are not to be condoned. But they happen,
and it's important for people on the net not to over-react. They happen 
at this time every year, and the forger
generally gets their kick from watching the novice users take the
posting seriously and try to flame their tails off. If we can keep a
level head and not react to these postings, they'll taper off rather
quickly and we can return to the normal state of affairs: chaos.

Thanks for your support.

Gene Spafford, Spokeman, The Backbone Cabal.

The April 1 post is funny because it contains all of the signs of a forged message that it claims to warn the reader about.^[128] But other forged messages are not quite so obvious or friendly. Beware.

Adding authentication to TCP/IP with ident

Many of the authentication problems discussed in the preceding sections arise because the TCP/IP protocol is a system for creating communication channels between computers, and not between users. When a server receives a TCP/IP connection from a client, it knows the IP address of the client—without that IP address, the server cannot complete the three-way TCP handshake and engage in two-way communications. However, the server has no way to readily ascertain the name of the person who initiated the TCP/IP connection.

When the TCP/IP protocol suite was developed, there was no need for a general-purpose approach for learning the names of people initiating TCP/IP connections. Protocols that required usernames (e.g., SMTP and FTP) provided them.

As the Internet has grown, network managers have discovered a very important reason for knowing the name of a person initiating a TCP/IP connection: accountability. If a remote system administrator discovers that her computer was attacked at 5:00 p.m. by a user at a computer named fas.harvard.edu, it is important to be able to trace that attack back to the specific user and account that was responsible for the attack so that either the user can be punished or the compromised account can be terminated. If only a single person was using fas.harvard.edu at 5:00 p.m., this may be a relatively easy matter to accomplish. But if fas.harvard.edu is a multiuser computer with hundreds of simultaneous users, finding the particular guilty party may be quite difficult.

The identification protocol gives you a way of addressing this problem with a simple callback scheme. When a server wants to know the “real name” of a person initiating a TCP/IP connection, it simply opens a connection to the client machine’s ident daemon (identd) and sends a description of the TCP/IP connection in progress; the remote machine sends a human-readable representation of the user who is initiating the connection.

Tip

Traditionally, the information sent back to the requesting system was the user’s username from the /etc/passwd file. More recent implementations of the ident daemon provide for an encrypted token to be sent back; the token can later be decrypted by the remote site with the cooperation of the site running the ident daemon. This prevents identd lookups from being used to get username information on a remote host without its cooperation.

The identification protocol depends on the honesty of the computer that is originating the TCP/IP connection. If your system is under attack from a multiuser system that has not been otherwise compromised, identd may be valuable. On the other hand, if your system is under attack from a single-user Linux computer that is not running identd or is running an identd that has been gimmicked to give untrue or misleading information, the response may be worthless. Because major IRC networks require clients to run an ident daemon, there are many free Windows-based ident daemons that return false responses.

In general, the responses of identd queries are more useful to the administrators of the site that sends the response than they are to the site that receives it. Thus, logging ident queries may not help you, but can be a courtesy to others—it lets the remote site know which account was involved in the attack. That’s especially useful if the attacker went on to erase log files or otherwise damage the originating site.

Not surprisingly, identd has been most useful in tracking down attackers originating at universities and other organizations with large multiuser Unix systems. Sites that have nonprivileged interactive Unix users should run ident to help track down accounts that have been compromised during an incident.

To make use of the identification protocol on the server side, you need to have a server program that understands the protocol and knows to place the callback. sendmail Version 8 and above will do so, for instance, as will tcpwrapper.

Non-TCP/IP Network Protocols

There are several other network protocols that may be involved in a network environment. We’ll mention them here, but we won’t go into detail about them as they are not as common in Unix environments as IP networks are. If you are curious about these other network protocols, we suggest that you consult a good book on networks and protocols; several are listed in Appendix C. These protocols can typically share the same physical network as an IP-based network, thus allowing more economical use of existing facilities, but they also make traffic more available to eavesdroppers and saboteurs.

Many protocols have been phased out in favor of TCP/IP. These include System Network Architecture ( SNA, used by IBM to link mainframes together), DECnet (developed by Digital Equipment Corporation to link their machines together), and Xerox Networks System ( XNS, used by . . . well, you can guess the rest). The Open System Interconnection (OSI) protocols are an incredibly complex and complete set of protocols for every kind of network implementation; they were developed by the International Standards Organization (ISO). Today, OSI survives only in the widespread adoption of its 7-layer model for understanding networks and the X.509 format for cryptographic certificates.

In addition to TCP/IP, there are three other competing protocols that are still in widepread use. Legacy Microsoft networks use a proprietary protocol called NetBIOS, Legacy Apple networks use a proprietary protocol called Appletalk, and Legacy Novell Netware networks use a proprietary protocol known as Internet^[129] Packet eXchange protocol (IPX). These protocols are designed for LANs; none of them scaled well to large networks such as the Internet.^[130] As a result, these three vendors have all developed strategies for transitioning their customers to TCP/IP.

NetBIOS is confusing because it is both a wire-level protocol and a file-sharing protocol. The file-sharing protocol can use NetBIOS packets or IP packets. NetBIOS and IPX are commonly found in PC-based networks, although Unix implementations for these protocols are available and used.

Warning

Even in installations that are TCP/IP-only, the Ethernet is frequently flooded with NetBIOS packets because these clients and servers are inadvertently left enabled on many Windows systems.

Decoy Systems

A final approach to handling attackers is to set up decoy systems for the attackers to attack. Decoy systems are closely monitored; often these systems are built with known vulnerabilities to increase their likelihood of attack.

Decoy systems, sometimes called honeypots,^[131] have two primary advantages:

Because they are closely monitored, decoy systems can be used to learn about attackers. Decoy systems can reveal attacker locations, techniques, motivations, skill levels, objectives, and many other pieces of information.
If a decoy system is sufficiently rich and compelling, exploring that system might consume so much of the attacker’s time that the attacker will not have the time to attack systems that you actually care about. For example, Brad Spencer has championed the use of honeypot open relays to monitor and distract email spammers (for some details, see http://fightrelayspam.homestead.com/files/antispam06132002.htm).

Decoy systems are not without their risks. The first risk is that the attacker will find something of value in the system. You must make absolutely certain that there is nothing on the decoy system that an attacker could use to harm you. Specifically, the decoy system should contain no information about your organization. One way to accomplish this goal is to use only new computers for your decoy system, rather than computers repurposed from other projects. Furthermore, if your organization has a firewall, the decoy system should be outside the firewall.

A second risk of decoy systems is that they can become platforms for attacking other computers on the Internet—possibly making you liable for third-party civil damages or even for charges of criminal conspiracy!

For both of these reasons, you should think carefully—and possibly consult with an attorney—before setting up a decoy or honeypot system.

^[123]Trivia: we appear to have been among the first authors to use the term “firewall” in print, in the first edition of this book. Gene Spafford coined the term based on some of his knowledge of building safety issues.

^[124]Although encryption protects the data in the packets, it does not prevent someone from determining the source and destination addresses and ports of the packets. After all, this information must be visible to any Internet router that receives the packets to enable it to route them correctly. Accordingly, an attacker can still learn which computers (or which networks) are communicating and which ports they are using. In some cases, this might be valuable information.

^[125]This description is a bit of an oversimplification, as one of this book’s reviewers pointed out. For the more technically minded, packets can get fragmented when they are transmitted, so an offset value is placed in each fragment to help the receiving system combine the fragments into a whole. It’s really the combination of the packet size and its offset value that overflowed the internal buffers of early implementations.

^[126]A double reverse lookup involves looking up the hostname that corresponds to an incoming IP connection, then doing a lookup on that hostname to verify that it has the same IP address. This process is non-trivial, as Internet computers can have more than one IP address, and IP addresses can resolve to more than one Internet hostname. Although the double reverse lookup is designed to detect primitive nameserver attacks, the process frequently instead detects sites that have not properly configured their nameserver files or programmers who do not know how to properly implement the algorithm.

^[127]The SMTP AUTH protocol extension (RFC 2554) defines a method for authenticating SMTP clients to restrict who can relay mail through an SMTP server. This doesn’t prevent the sender from forging any of the messages headers, but makes such forgery far more likely to be detected.

^[128]Nonetheless, when the message was first posted, dozens of people were fooled and sent “Thank you” messages to Spafford, or sent corrections to the misspelled words.

^[129]The “Internet” that appears in the name of Novell’s protocol is not the same Internet that is generally thought of as today’s Internet. Novell’s Internet is instead literally a network between other networks.

^[130]RFC 1234 describes a system for connecting IPX networks together using IP networks and a technique known as tunneling .

^[131]Or the more ambitious honeynets, discussed at http://project.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/.

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