Table of Contents for
Practical UNIX and Internet Security, 3rd Edition

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical UNIX and Internet Security, 3rd Edition by Alan Schwartz Published by O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2003
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Unix & Internet Security, 3rd Edition
  3. A Note Regarding Supplemental Files
  4. Preface
  5. Unix “Security”?
  6. Scope of This Book
  7. Which Unix System?
  8. Conventions Used in This Book
  9. Comments and Questions
  10. Acknowledgments
  11. A Note to Would-Be Attackers
  12. I. Computer Security Basics
  13. 1. Introduction: Some Fundamental Questions
  14. What Is Computer Security?
  15. What Is an Operating System?
  16. What Is a Deployment Environment?
  17. Summary
  18. 2. Unix History and Lineage
  19. History of Unix
  20. Security and Unix
  21. Role of This Book
  22. Summary
  23. 3. Policies and Guidelines
  24. Planning Your Security Needs
  25. Risk Assessment
  26. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Best Practices
  27. Policy
  28. Compliance Audits
  29. Outsourcing Options
  30. The Problem with Security Through Obscurity
  31. Summary
  32. II. Security Building Blocks
  33. 4. Users, Passwords, and Authentication
  34. Logging in with Usernames and Passwords
  35. The Care and Feeding of Passwords
  36. How Unix Implements Passwords
  37. Network Account and Authorization Systems
  38. Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
  39. Summary
  40. 5. Users, Groups, and the Superuser
  41. Users and Groups
  42. The Superuser (root)
  43. The su Command: Changing Who You Claim to Be
  44. Restrictions on the Superuser
  45. Summary
  46. 6. Filesystems and Security
  47. Understanding Filesystems
  48. File Attributes and Permissions
  49. chmod: Changing a File’s Permissions
  50. The umask
  51. SUID and SGID
  52. Device Files
  53. Changing a File’s Owner or Group
  54. Summary
  55. 7. Cryptography Basics
  56. Understanding Cryptography
  57. Symmetric Key Algorithms
  58. Public Key Algorithms
  59. Message Digest Functions
  60. Summary
  61. 8. Physical Security for Servers
  62. Planning for the Forgotten Threats
  63. Protecting Computer Hardware
  64. Preventing Theft
  65. Protecting Your Data
  66. Story: A Failed Site Inspection
  67. Summary
  68. 9. Personnel Security
  69. Background Checks
  70. On the Job
  71. Departure
  72. Other People
  73. Summary
  74. III. Network and Internet Security
  75. 10. Modems and Dialup Security
  76. Modems: Theory of Operation
  77. Modems and Security
  78. Modems and Unix
  79. Additional Security for Modems
  80. Summary
  81. 11. TCP/IP Networks
  82. Networking
  83. IP: The Internet Protocol
  84. IP Security
  85. Summary
  86. 12. Securing TCP and UDP Services
  87. Understanding Unix Internet Servers and Services
  88. Controlling Access to Servers
  89. Primary Unix Network Services
  90. Managing Services Securely
  91. Putting It All Together: An Example
  92. Summary
  93. 13. Sun RPC
  94. Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
  95. Secure RPC (AUTH_DES)
  96. Summary
  97. 14. Network-Based Authentication Systems
  98. Sun’s Network Information Service (NIS)
  99. Sun’s NIS+
  100. Kerberos
  101. LDAP
  102. Other Network Authentication Systems
  103. Summary
  104. 15. Network Filesystems
  105. Understanding NFS
  106. Server-Side NFS Security
  107. Client-Side NFS Security
  108. Improving NFS Security
  109. Some Last Comments on NFS
  110. Understanding SMB
  111. Summary
  112. 16. Secure Programming Techniques
  113. One Bug Can Ruin Your Whole Day . . .
  114. Tips on Avoiding Security-Related Bugs
  115. Tips on Writing Network Programs
  116. Tips on Writing SUID/SGID Programs
  117. Using chroot( )
  118. Tips on Using Passwords
  119. Tips on Generating Random Numbers
  120. Summary
  121. IV. Secure Operations
  122. 17. Keeping Up to Date
  123. Software Management Systems
  124. Updating System Software
  125. Summary
  126. 18. Backups
  127. Why Make Backups?
  128. Backing Up System Files
  129. Software for Backups
  130. Summary
  131. 19. Defending Accounts
  132. Dangerous Accounts
  133. Monitoring File Format
  134. Restricting Logins
  135. Managing Dormant Accounts
  136. Protecting the root Account
  137. One-Time Passwords
  138. Administrative Techniques for Conventional Passwords
  139. Intrusion Detection Systems
  140. Summary
  141. 20. Integrity Management
  142. The Need for Integrity
  143. Protecting Integrity
  144. Detecting Changes After the Fact
  145. Integrity-Checking Tools
  146. Summary
  147. 21. Auditing, Logging, and Forensics
  148. Unix Log File Utilities
  149. Process Accounting: The acct/pacct File
  150. Program-Specific Log Files
  151. Designing a Site-Wide Log Policy
  152. Handwritten Logs
  153. Managing Log Files
  154. Unix Forensics
  155. Summary
  156. V. Handling Security Incidents
  157. 22. Discovering a Break-in
  158. Prelude
  159. Discovering an Intruder
  160. Cleaning Up After the Intruder
  161. Case Studies
  162. Summary
  163. 23. Protecting Against Programmed Threats
  164. Programmed Threats: Definitions
  165. Damage
  166. Authors
  167. Entry
  168. Protecting Yourself
  169. Preventing Attacks
  170. Summary
  171. 24. Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions
  172. Types of Attacks
  173. Destructive Attacks
  174. Overload Attacks
  175. Network Denial of Service Attacks
  176. Summary
  177. 25. Computer Crime
  178. Your Legal Options After a Break-in
  179. Criminal Hazards
  180. Criminal Subject Matter
  181. Summary
  182. 26. Who Do You Trust?
  183. Can You Trust Your Computer?
  184. Can You Trust Your Suppliers?
  185. Can You Trust People?
  186. Summary
  187. VI. Appendixes
  188. A. Unix Security Checklist
  189. Preface
  190. Chapter 1: Introduction: Some Fundamental Questions
  191. Chapter 2: Unix History and Lineage
  192. Chapter 3: Policies and Guidelines
  193. Chapter 4: Users, Passwords, and Authentication
  194. Chapter 5: Users, Groups, and the Superuser
  195. Chapter 6: Filesystems and Security
  196. Chapter 7: Cryptography Basics
  197. Chapter 8: Physical Security for Servers
  198. Chapter 9: Personnel Security
  199. Chapter 10: Modems and Dialup Security
  200. Chapter 11: TCP/IP Networks
  201. Chapter 12: Securing TCP and UDP Services
  202. Chapter 13: Sun RPC
  203. Chapter 14: Network-Based Authentication Systems
  204. Chapter 15: Network Filesystems
  205. Chapter 16: Secure Programming Techniques
  206. Chapter 17: Keeping Up to Date
  207. Chapter 18: Backups
  208. Chapter 19: Defending Accounts
  209. Chapter 20: Integrity Management
  210. Chapter 21: Auditing, Logging, and Forensics
  211. Chapter 22: Discovering a Break-In
  212. Chapter 23: Protecting Against Programmed Threats
  213. Chapter 24: Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions
  214. Chapter 25: Computer Crime
  215. Chapter 26: Who Do You Trust?
  216. Appendix A: Unix Security Checklist
  217. Appendix B: Unix Processes
  218. Appendixes C, D, and E: Paper Sources, Electronic Sources, and Organizations
  219. B. Unix Processes
  220. About Processes
  221. Signals
  222. Controlling and Examining Processes
  223. Starting Up Unix and Logging In
  224. C. Paper Sources
  225. Unix Security References
  226. Other Computer References
  227. D. Electronic Resources
  228. Mailing Lists
  229. Web Sites
  230. Usenet Groups
  231. Software Resources
  232. E. Organizations
  233. Professional Organizations
  234. U.S. Government Organizations
  235. Emergency Response Organizations
  236. Index
  237. Index
  238. Index
  239. Index
  240. Index
  241. Index
  242. Index
  243. Index
  244. Index
  245. Index
  246. Index
  247. Index
  248. Index
  249. Index
  250. Index
  251. Index
  252. Index
  253. Index
  254. Index
  255. Index
  256. Index
  257. Index
  258. Index
  259. Index
  260. Index
  261. Index
  262. Index
  263. About the Authors
  264. Colophon
  265. Copyright

Authors

Little is known about the people who write programmed threats, largely because few of the authors have been identified. Based on those authors who are known to authorities, they can probably be grouped into a few major categories:

Students

The first Internet worm was written by a graduate student, apparently to demonstrate a class of security problems. The ILOVEYOU computer worm was written by computer science undergraduate students as a class project, again as a demonstration. Following both incidents, the individuals admitted that they had exercised poor judgment and had not anticipated how far these programs would spread. Poor judgment or not, courts have ruled that writing and releasing such programs is criminal behavior.

Publicity hounds

Another motivation for writing a virus or worm might be to profit, gain fame, or simply derive some ego gratification from the pursuit. For example, the Melissa computer worm was written by a computer programmer who wanted to impress an exotic dancer of the same name. The Back Orifice Trojan horse was written by the Cult of the Dead Cow as an apparent publicity stunt.

In the future, someone might write a virus and release it, and then try to gain publicity as its discoverer, be the first to market software that deactivates it, or simply brag about it on a bulletin board. This notion is similar to a firefighter setting fire to a building so that he can take the credit for putting the fire out.

Experimenters and hobbyists

Some of the most potent PC viruses have been written by a small group of Eastern European programmers who compete with each other to see who can create the most effective virus.

Common criminals

A few viruses have been written to commit acts of extortion or wipe out evidence of another crime. In several cases, viruses have been written as acts of revenge against a company or government agency, and have spread to a worldwide audience.

Activists

There is a history of some viruses being written to make political statements. For instance, there have been viruses with messages against political figures (e.g., Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher), against various government policies (e.g., marijuana laws), and against commercial interests (e.g., anti-fur and anti-logging).

Information warfare researchers

Since (at least) the 1990s, governments and government contractors have been developing computer viruses, Trojan horses, and other information warfare tools. Some of this research has been for the purpose of developing defensive technologies against these threats, while other research has been geared towards developing an offensive capability that could be targeted against an enemy. Such work is similar in spirit to work on biological weapons undertaken by the U.S. and Soviet Union during and after the Second World War.

Some recent worms and viruses appear to have been targeted at the U.S. by Chinese authors as a result of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and again after the mid-air collision between an F-8 fighter and a U.S. Navy EP-3E surveillance aircraft in 2001. Because of the tight control exercised over Internet access in China, some authorities suspect that these were state-sponsored attacks.

Once programs are written, they can be planted or distributed by many more kinds of individuals, including:

Program authors

Many viruses and worms are distributed by their authors. Such distribution can be either intentional or unintentional.

Employees

One of the largest categories of individuals who cause security problems includes disgruntled employees or ex-employees who feel that they have been treated poorly or who bear some grudge against their employer. These individuals know the potential weaknesses in an organization’s computer security. Sometimes they may install logic bombs or back doors in the software in case of future difficulty. They may trigger the code themselves, or have it triggered by a bug or another employee.

Thieves

Another category includes thieves and embezzlers. These individuals may attempt to disrupt the system to take advantage of the situation or to mask evidence of their criminal activity.

Spies

Industrial or political espionage or sabotage is another reason people might write malicious software. Programmed threats are a powerful and potentially untraceable means of obtaining classified or proprietary information, or of delaying the competition (sabotage), although they are not very common in practice.

Extortionists

Extortion may also be a motive, with the authors threatening to unleash destructive software unless they are paid a ransom. Many companies have been victims of a form of extortion in which they have agreed not to prosecute (and sometimes go on to hire) individuals who have broken into or damaged their systems. In return, the criminals agree to disclose the security flaws that allowed them to crack the system. An implied threat is that of negative publicity about the security of the company if the perpetrator is brought to trial, and of additional damage if the flaws are not revealed and corrected.[334]

Political activists

One ongoing element in the writing and distribution of programmed threats seems to be an underlying political motivation. These viruses or worms make some form of politically oriented statement when run or detected, either as their primary purpose or as a form of smokescreen.

No matter what their numbers or motives, authors of code that intentionally destroys other people’s data are vandals. Their intent may not be criminal, but their acts certainly are. Portraying these people as heroes, as clever or simply as harmless “nerds” masks the dangers involved and may help protect authors who attack with more malicious intent.



[334] This is why, in the scenario at the beginning of the chapter, the victim might be more likely to pay than to call the authorities.