Table of Contents for
Practical UNIX and Internet Security, 3rd Edition

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical UNIX and Internet Security, 3rd Edition by Alan Schwartz Published by O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2003
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Unix & Internet Security, 3rd Edition
  3. A Note Regarding Supplemental Files
  4. Preface
  5. Unix “Security”?
  6. Scope of This Book
  7. Which Unix System?
  8. Conventions Used in This Book
  9. Comments and Questions
  10. Acknowledgments
  11. A Note to Would-Be Attackers
  12. I. Computer Security Basics
  13. 1. Introduction: Some Fundamental Questions
  14. What Is Computer Security?
  15. What Is an Operating System?
  16. What Is a Deployment Environment?
  17. Summary
  18. 2. Unix History and Lineage
  19. History of Unix
  20. Security and Unix
  21. Role of This Book
  22. Summary
  23. 3. Policies and Guidelines
  24. Planning Your Security Needs
  25. Risk Assessment
  26. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Best Practices
  27. Policy
  28. Compliance Audits
  29. Outsourcing Options
  30. The Problem with Security Through Obscurity
  31. Summary
  32. II. Security Building Blocks
  33. 4. Users, Passwords, and Authentication
  34. Logging in with Usernames and Passwords
  35. The Care and Feeding of Passwords
  36. How Unix Implements Passwords
  37. Network Account and Authorization Systems
  38. Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
  39. Summary
  40. 5. Users, Groups, and the Superuser
  41. Users and Groups
  42. The Superuser (root)
  43. The su Command: Changing Who You Claim to Be
  44. Restrictions on the Superuser
  45. Summary
  46. 6. Filesystems and Security
  47. Understanding Filesystems
  48. File Attributes and Permissions
  49. chmod: Changing a File’s Permissions
  50. The umask
  51. SUID and SGID
  52. Device Files
  53. Changing a File’s Owner or Group
  54. Summary
  55. 7. Cryptography Basics
  56. Understanding Cryptography
  57. Symmetric Key Algorithms
  58. Public Key Algorithms
  59. Message Digest Functions
  60. Summary
  61. 8. Physical Security for Servers
  62. Planning for the Forgotten Threats
  63. Protecting Computer Hardware
  64. Preventing Theft
  65. Protecting Your Data
  66. Story: A Failed Site Inspection
  67. Summary
  68. 9. Personnel Security
  69. Background Checks
  70. On the Job
  71. Departure
  72. Other People
  73. Summary
  74. III. Network and Internet Security
  75. 10. Modems and Dialup Security
  76. Modems: Theory of Operation
  77. Modems and Security
  78. Modems and Unix
  79. Additional Security for Modems
  80. Summary
  81. 11. TCP/IP Networks
  82. Networking
  83. IP: The Internet Protocol
  84. IP Security
  85. Summary
  86. 12. Securing TCP and UDP Services
  87. Understanding Unix Internet Servers and Services
  88. Controlling Access to Servers
  89. Primary Unix Network Services
  90. Managing Services Securely
  91. Putting It All Together: An Example
  92. Summary
  93. 13. Sun RPC
  94. Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
  95. Secure RPC (AUTH_DES)
  96. Summary
  97. 14. Network-Based Authentication Systems
  98. Sun’s Network Information Service (NIS)
  99. Sun’s NIS+
  100. Kerberos
  101. LDAP
  102. Other Network Authentication Systems
  103. Summary
  104. 15. Network Filesystems
  105. Understanding NFS
  106. Server-Side NFS Security
  107. Client-Side NFS Security
  108. Improving NFS Security
  109. Some Last Comments on NFS
  110. Understanding SMB
  111. Summary
  112. 16. Secure Programming Techniques
  113. One Bug Can Ruin Your Whole Day . . .
  114. Tips on Avoiding Security-Related Bugs
  115. Tips on Writing Network Programs
  116. Tips on Writing SUID/SGID Programs
  117. Using chroot( )
  118. Tips on Using Passwords
  119. Tips on Generating Random Numbers
  120. Summary
  121. IV. Secure Operations
  122. 17. Keeping Up to Date
  123. Software Management Systems
  124. Updating System Software
  125. Summary
  126. 18. Backups
  127. Why Make Backups?
  128. Backing Up System Files
  129. Software for Backups
  130. Summary
  131. 19. Defending Accounts
  132. Dangerous Accounts
  133. Monitoring File Format
  134. Restricting Logins
  135. Managing Dormant Accounts
  136. Protecting the root Account
  137. One-Time Passwords
  138. Administrative Techniques for Conventional Passwords
  139. Intrusion Detection Systems
  140. Summary
  141. 20. Integrity Management
  142. The Need for Integrity
  143. Protecting Integrity
  144. Detecting Changes After the Fact
  145. Integrity-Checking Tools
  146. Summary
  147. 21. Auditing, Logging, and Forensics
  148. Unix Log File Utilities
  149. Process Accounting: The acct/pacct File
  150. Program-Specific Log Files
  151. Designing a Site-Wide Log Policy
  152. Handwritten Logs
  153. Managing Log Files
  154. Unix Forensics
  155. Summary
  156. V. Handling Security Incidents
  157. 22. Discovering a Break-in
  158. Prelude
  159. Discovering an Intruder
  160. Cleaning Up After the Intruder
  161. Case Studies
  162. Summary
  163. 23. Protecting Against Programmed Threats
  164. Programmed Threats: Definitions
  165. Damage
  166. Authors
  167. Entry
  168. Protecting Yourself
  169. Preventing Attacks
  170. Summary
  171. 24. Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions
  172. Types of Attacks
  173. Destructive Attacks
  174. Overload Attacks
  175. Network Denial of Service Attacks
  176. Summary
  177. 25. Computer Crime
  178. Your Legal Options After a Break-in
  179. Criminal Hazards
  180. Criminal Subject Matter
  181. Summary
  182. 26. Who Do You Trust?
  183. Can You Trust Your Computer?
  184. Can You Trust Your Suppliers?
  185. Can You Trust People?
  186. Summary
  187. VI. Appendixes
  188. A. Unix Security Checklist
  189. Preface
  190. Chapter 1: Introduction: Some Fundamental Questions
  191. Chapter 2: Unix History and Lineage
  192. Chapter 3: Policies and Guidelines
  193. Chapter 4: Users, Passwords, and Authentication
  194. Chapter 5: Users, Groups, and the Superuser
  195. Chapter 6: Filesystems and Security
  196. Chapter 7: Cryptography Basics
  197. Chapter 8: Physical Security for Servers
  198. Chapter 9: Personnel Security
  199. Chapter 10: Modems and Dialup Security
  200. Chapter 11: TCP/IP Networks
  201. Chapter 12: Securing TCP and UDP Services
  202. Chapter 13: Sun RPC
  203. Chapter 14: Network-Based Authentication Systems
  204. Chapter 15: Network Filesystems
  205. Chapter 16: Secure Programming Techniques
  206. Chapter 17: Keeping Up to Date
  207. Chapter 18: Backups
  208. Chapter 19: Defending Accounts
  209. Chapter 20: Integrity Management
  210. Chapter 21: Auditing, Logging, and Forensics
  211. Chapter 22: Discovering a Break-In
  212. Chapter 23: Protecting Against Programmed Threats
  213. Chapter 24: Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions
  214. Chapter 25: Computer Crime
  215. Chapter 26: Who Do You Trust?
  216. Appendix A: Unix Security Checklist
  217. Appendix B: Unix Processes
  218. Appendixes C, D, and E: Paper Sources, Electronic Sources, and Organizations
  219. B. Unix Processes
  220. About Processes
  221. Signals
  222. Controlling and Examining Processes
  223. Starting Up Unix and Logging In
  224. C. Paper Sources
  225. Unix Security References
  226. Other Computer References
  227. D. Electronic Resources
  228. Mailing Lists
  229. Web Sites
  230. Usenet Groups
  231. Software Resources
  232. E. Organizations
  233. Professional Organizations
  234. U.S. Government Organizations
  235. Emergency Response Organizations
  236. Index
  237. Index
  238. Index
  239. Index
  240. Index
  241. Index
  242. Index
  243. Index
  244. Index
  245. Index
  246. Index
  247. Index
  248. Index
  249. Index
  250. Index
  251. Index
  252. Index
  253. Index
  254. Index
  255. Index
  256. Index
  257. Index
  258. Index
  259. Index
  260. Index
  261. Index
  262. Index
  263. About the Authors
  264. Colophon
  265. Copyright

Controlling and Examining Processes

In addition to ps and kill, Unix supports a large number of lesser known tools for examining and controlling running processes. These commands can be useful for programmers and system administrators; they are also very helpful in analyzing the processes of an attacker during and after a break-in. Some of the ways you can examine or control processes include the following:

gdb

You can attach to the running process with a debugger such as gdb.

gcore

You can use the gcore command to dump the process memory map.

lsof

You can use the lsof program to list the open files in use by the program.

/proc

You can examine the process directly using the /proc process filesystem.

pstree

You can see a tree of all processes with the pstree command.

Not all of these tools are available on every version of Unix.

Strictly speaking, many of these tools will work with processes that are either running or stopped. However, if you have a rogue process on your system, you may wish to stop it with the SIGSTOP signal before examining it.

Note

One reason to be familiar with these tools is that many attackers will modify a penetrated system in such a way that the system ps command will no longer display processes belonging to the attacker. These modifications are most often done with programs that are collectively known as rootkits.

Once a system has been modified with a rootkit, it can be very difficult to detect the continued presence of an attacker. However, few rootkits modify such programs as lsof or pstree. Thus, if these tools show that a process is present on your system but the ps command does not, that is a good indication that your system has been compromised.

gdb: Controlling a Process

On many systems, you can use the gdb command to “attach” to a running process. If the process is running an executable that was linked with a full symbol table, you will be able to use the debugger to examine the process’s variables and detailed call stack. Even if you do not have an executable that was linked for debugging, you may be able to use the debugger to determine what the process is doing.

adb and dbx are additional debuggers you can use to control processes.

gcore: Dumping Core

Under many versions of Unix, you can use the gcore program to generate a core file of a running process. A core file is a specially formatted image of the memory being used by the process at the time the signal was caught.

Tip

Some versions of Unix name core files core.####, in which #### is the PID of the process that generated the core file, or name.core, in which name is the name of the program’s executable. Others simply use the name core.

Once you have a core file, you can examine it with adb (a debugger), dbx (another debugger), or gdb (yet another debugger). By examining the core file with a debugger, you can see which routines were executed, register values, and more. If you simply want to get an idea of what the process was doing, you can run strings (a program that finds printable strings in a binary file) over the core image to see which files it was referencing. If the process was running a shell such as sh or csh, the strings command will display the shell’s history.

Programs that you run may also dump core if they receive one of the signals that causes a core dump. On systems without a gcore program, you can send a SIGEMT or SIGSYS signal to cause the program to dump core. This method will work only if the process is currently in a directory where it can write, it has not redefined the action to receive the signal, and the core will not be larger than the core file limits imposed for the process’s UID. If you use this approach, you will also be faced with the problem of finding where the process left the core file!

Warning

Core files are big! You can fill your disk with a core file—be sure to look at the memory size of a process via the ps command before you try to get its core image.

lsof: Examining a Process

The List of Open Files (lsof) command is now provided as a standard part of many Unix systems; it is available as a free download for still more systems.[373]

As the name implies, this command examines the kernel’s table of file descriptors associated with each process and displays the name of each file that is currently opened. In addition to giving the name of each file being currently referenced, lsof reveals the name of the executable currently being run by the process and the filenames of all mapped-in shared libraries. Besides this information, current versions of lsof can report open TCP/IP connections, as well as TCP and UDP sockets that are being listened to.

When lsof is run by a user, the program restricts its output to processes that are owned by that user. When lsof is run by the superuser, the program displays output for all processes on the system.

Here is an example of the output from the lsof command:

[simsong@r2 ~] 304 % lsof
COMMAND   PID    USER   FD   TYPE     DEVICE   SIZE/OFF     NODE NAME
tcsh    81776 simsong  cwd   VDIR       13,2      15360 12657945 /usr/home/simsong
tcsh    81776 simsong  rtd   VDIR 116,131072       1024        2 /
tcsh    81776 simsong  txt   VREG 116,131072     638988     6355 /bin/tcsh
tcsh    81776 simsong   15u  VCHR        5,3   0t138415     7898 /dev/ttyp3
tcsh    81776 simsong   16u  VCHR        5,3   0t138415     7898 /dev/ttyp3
tcsh    81776 simsong   17u  VCHR        5,3   0t138415     7898 /dev/ttyp3
tcsh    81776 simsong   18u  VCHR        5,3   0t138415     7898 /dev/ttyp3
tcsh    81776 simsong   19u  VCHR        5,3   0t138415     7898 /dev/ttyp3
lsof    81991 simsong  cwd   VDIR       13,2      15360 12657945 /usr/home/simsong
lsof    81991 simsong  rtd   VDIR 116,131072       1024        2 /
lsof    81991 simsong  txt   VREG       13,2     106848  7618686 /usr/local/sbin/lsof
lsof    81991 simsong  txt   VREG       13,2      76752  1984040 /usr/libexec/ld-elf.
so.1
lsof    81991 simsong  txt   VREG       13,2      19232   634990 /usr/lib/libkvm.so.2
lsof    81991 simsong  txt   VREG       13,2     573888   634976 /usr/lib/libc.so.4
lsof    81991 simsong    0u  VCHR        5,3   0t138415     7898 /dev/ttyp3
lsof    81991 simsong    1u  VCHR        5,3   0t138415     7898 /dev/ttyp3
lsof    81991 simsong    2u  VCHR        5,3   0t138415     7898 /dev/ttyp3
lsof    81991 simsong    3r  VCHR        2,0        0t0     6880 /dev/mem
lsof    81991 simsong    4r  VCHR        2,1 0xc28649c0     6872 /dev/kmem
[simsong@r2 ~] 305 %

The lsof program has too many options to list here. There are significant security issues that arise from its installation and use—specifically, lsof lists the names of files throughout the filesystem, and this information is cached in a file that is located in the home directory of the person who runs the lsof command. The lsof command can be compiled and installed with various options that minimize the privacy exposure that can result from these cache files. For details, consult the lsof documentation.

/proc: Examining a Process Directly

/proc is the process filesystem. It allows user programs to access aspects of a process through the filesystem interface in a relatively transparent and straightforward fashion, without having to open up the kernel’s memory and wade through memory structures. It also allows direct access to the memory space of other processes, which is otherwise impossible or very difficult.

pstree: Viewing the Process Tree

Every Unix process has an associated parent process. Normally, this information is displayed as a form similar to the display of the PPID field output by the ps command. The pstree command uses this information to draw a graph of all of the processes currently running.

During a break-in, the process tree can be very useful for understanding which processes were launched by the attacker and which are innocent processes that happen to be running on the same system.

With the -u option, the pstree command will show UID transitions—that is, when one process has a child that is executing under a separate UID. Another useful option is -a, which shows the entire command line that was executed. For a list of all the options, see the documentation.

Here is an example of the output of the pstree program:

% pstree -u
init-+-arpwatch
     |-cron
     |-dhcpd
     |-gdomap(nobody)
     |-8*[getty]
     |-httpd---11*[httpd(http)]
     |-inetd-+-imapd(simsong)
     |       `-sslwrap
     |-lpd
     |-master-+-2*[bounce(postfix)]
     |        |-cleanup(postfix)
     |        |-flush(postfix)
     |        |-local(postfix)
     |        |-pickup(postfix)
     |        |-qmgr(postfix)
     |        |-2*[smtp(postfix)]
     |        |-smtpd(postfix)
     |        |-tlsmgr(postfix)
     |        `-trivial-rewrite(postfix)
     |-mountd
     |-moused
     |-named
     |-nfsd---4*[nfsd]
     |-4*[nfsiod]
     |-nmbd---nmbd
     |-ntpd
     |-portmap(daemon)
     |-pwcheck
     |-rpc.statd
     |-rwhod(daemon)
     |-setiathome(nobody)
     |-slapd
     |-smbd---smbd(beth)
     |-snmpd
     |-sshd-+-sshd---tcsh(simsong)---pstree
     |      |-sshd---tcsh(simsong)---tcsh(root)
     |      `-sshd---tcsh(simsong)
     |-syslogd
     `-usbd

The boldfaced line near the end of this output shows that init (executing as root) spawned an sshd process (executing as root). This process forks a child (still root-owned in this case) for each incoming connection. When simsong logged into this sshd connection, it started up a shell (tcsh) owned by simsong, and simsong has apparently managed to start a root-privileged tcsh shell (perhaps with /bin/su, but if you don’t expect simsong to have the root password, this is cause for concern)!



[373] lsof Version 4.64 is available from ftp://vic.cc.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/lsof/ for at least the following Unix systems: AIX 4.3.[23], 5L, and 5.1; Apple Darwin 1.[23] and 1.4 for Power Macintosh systems; BSDI BSD/OS 4.1 for Intel-based systems; DEC OSF/1, Digital UNIX, Tru64 UNIX 4.0, and 5.[01]; FreeBSD 4.[23456] and 5.0 for Intel-based systems; HP-UX 11.00 and 11.11; Linux 2.1.72 and above for Intel-based systems; NetBSD 1.[456] for Alpha-, Intel-, and SPARC-based systems; NEXTSTEP 3.[13] for NEXTSTEP architectures; OpenBSD 2.[89] and 3.[01] for Intel-based systems; OPENSTEP 4.x; Caldera OpenUNIX 8; SCO OpenServer Release 5.0.[46] for Intel-based systems; SCO UnixWare 7.1.1 for Intel-based systems; Solaris 2.6, 7, 8, and 9 BETA-Refresh.