Table of Contents for
Practical UNIX and Internet Security, 3rd Edition

Version ebook / Retour

Cover image for bash Cookbook, 2nd Edition Practical UNIX and Internet Security, 3rd Edition by Alan Schwartz Published by O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2003
  1. Cover
  2. Practical Unix & Internet Security, 3rd Edition
  3. A Note Regarding Supplemental Files
  4. Preface
  5. Unix “Security”?
  6. Scope of This Book
  7. Which Unix System?
  8. Conventions Used in This Book
  9. Comments and Questions
  10. Acknowledgments
  11. A Note to Would-Be Attackers
  12. I. Computer Security Basics
  13. 1. Introduction: Some Fundamental Questions
  14. What Is Computer Security?
  15. What Is an Operating System?
  16. What Is a Deployment Environment?
  17. Summary
  18. 2. Unix History and Lineage
  19. History of Unix
  20. Security and Unix
  21. Role of This Book
  22. Summary
  23. 3. Policies and Guidelines
  24. Planning Your Security Needs
  25. Risk Assessment
  26. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Best Practices
  27. Policy
  28. Compliance Audits
  29. Outsourcing Options
  30. The Problem with Security Through Obscurity
  31. Summary
  32. II. Security Building Blocks
  33. 4. Users, Passwords, and Authentication
  34. Logging in with Usernames and Passwords
  35. The Care and Feeding of Passwords
  36. How Unix Implements Passwords
  37. Network Account and Authorization Systems
  38. Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM)
  39. Summary
  40. 5. Users, Groups, and the Superuser
  41. Users and Groups
  42. The Superuser (root)
  43. The su Command: Changing Who You Claim to Be
  44. Restrictions on the Superuser
  45. Summary
  46. 6. Filesystems and Security
  47. Understanding Filesystems
  48. File Attributes and Permissions
  49. chmod: Changing a File’s Permissions
  50. The umask
  51. SUID and SGID
  52. Device Files
  53. Changing a File’s Owner or Group
  54. Summary
  55. 7. Cryptography Basics
  56. Understanding Cryptography
  57. Symmetric Key Algorithms
  58. Public Key Algorithms
  59. Message Digest Functions
  60. Summary
  61. 8. Physical Security for Servers
  62. Planning for the Forgotten Threats
  63. Protecting Computer Hardware
  64. Preventing Theft
  65. Protecting Your Data
  66. Story: A Failed Site Inspection
  67. Summary
  68. 9. Personnel Security
  69. Background Checks
  70. On the Job
  71. Departure
  72. Other People
  73. Summary
  74. III. Network and Internet Security
  75. 10. Modems and Dialup Security
  76. Modems: Theory of Operation
  77. Modems and Security
  78. Modems and Unix
  79. Additional Security for Modems
  80. Summary
  81. 11. TCP/IP Networks
  82. Networking
  83. IP: The Internet Protocol
  84. IP Security
  85. Summary
  86. 12. Securing TCP and UDP Services
  87. Understanding Unix Internet Servers and Services
  88. Controlling Access to Servers
  89. Primary Unix Network Services
  90. Managing Services Securely
  91. Putting It All Together: An Example
  92. Summary
  93. 13. Sun RPC
  94. Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
  95. Secure RPC (AUTH_DES)
  96. Summary
  97. 14. Network-Based Authentication Systems
  98. Sun’s Network Information Service (NIS)
  99. Sun’s NIS+
  100. Kerberos
  101. LDAP
  102. Other Network Authentication Systems
  103. Summary
  104. 15. Network Filesystems
  105. Understanding NFS
  106. Server-Side NFS Security
  107. Client-Side NFS Security
  108. Improving NFS Security
  109. Some Last Comments on NFS
  110. Understanding SMB
  111. Summary
  112. 16. Secure Programming Techniques
  113. One Bug Can Ruin Your Whole Day . . .
  114. Tips on Avoiding Security-Related Bugs
  115. Tips on Writing Network Programs
  116. Tips on Writing SUID/SGID Programs
  117. Using chroot( )
  118. Tips on Using Passwords
  119. Tips on Generating Random Numbers
  120. Summary
  121. IV. Secure Operations
  122. 17. Keeping Up to Date
  123. Software Management Systems
  124. Updating System Software
  125. Summary
  126. 18. Backups
  127. Why Make Backups?
  128. Backing Up System Files
  129. Software for Backups
  130. Summary
  131. 19. Defending Accounts
  132. Dangerous Accounts
  133. Monitoring File Format
  134. Restricting Logins
  135. Managing Dormant Accounts
  136. Protecting the root Account
  137. One-Time Passwords
  138. Administrative Techniques for Conventional Passwords
  139. Intrusion Detection Systems
  140. Summary
  141. 20. Integrity Management
  142. The Need for Integrity
  143. Protecting Integrity
  144. Detecting Changes After the Fact
  145. Integrity-Checking Tools
  146. Summary
  147. 21. Auditing, Logging, and Forensics
  148. Unix Log File Utilities
  149. Process Accounting: The acct/pacct File
  150. Program-Specific Log Files
  151. Designing a Site-Wide Log Policy
  152. Handwritten Logs
  153. Managing Log Files
  154. Unix Forensics
  155. Summary
  156. V. Handling Security Incidents
  157. 22. Discovering a Break-in
  158. Prelude
  159. Discovering an Intruder
  160. Cleaning Up After the Intruder
  161. Case Studies
  162. Summary
  163. 23. Protecting Against Programmed Threats
  164. Programmed Threats: Definitions
  165. Damage
  166. Authors
  167. Entry
  168. Protecting Yourself
  169. Preventing Attacks
  170. Summary
  171. 24. Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions
  172. Types of Attacks
  173. Destructive Attacks
  174. Overload Attacks
  175. Network Denial of Service Attacks
  176. Summary
  177. 25. Computer Crime
  178. Your Legal Options After a Break-in
  179. Criminal Hazards
  180. Criminal Subject Matter
  181. Summary
  182. 26. Who Do You Trust?
  183. Can You Trust Your Computer?
  184. Can You Trust Your Suppliers?
  185. Can You Trust People?
  186. Summary
  187. VI. Appendixes
  188. A. Unix Security Checklist
  189. Preface
  190. Chapter 1: Introduction: Some Fundamental Questions
  191. Chapter 2: Unix History and Lineage
  192. Chapter 3: Policies and Guidelines
  193. Chapter 4: Users, Passwords, and Authentication
  194. Chapter 5: Users, Groups, and the Superuser
  195. Chapter 6: Filesystems and Security
  196. Chapter 7: Cryptography Basics
  197. Chapter 8: Physical Security for Servers
  198. Chapter 9: Personnel Security
  199. Chapter 10: Modems and Dialup Security
  200. Chapter 11: TCP/IP Networks
  201. Chapter 12: Securing TCP and UDP Services
  202. Chapter 13: Sun RPC
  203. Chapter 14: Network-Based Authentication Systems
  204. Chapter 15: Network Filesystems
  205. Chapter 16: Secure Programming Techniques
  206. Chapter 17: Keeping Up to Date
  207. Chapter 18: Backups
  208. Chapter 19: Defending Accounts
  209. Chapter 20: Integrity Management
  210. Chapter 21: Auditing, Logging, and Forensics
  211. Chapter 22: Discovering a Break-In
  212. Chapter 23: Protecting Against Programmed Threats
  213. Chapter 24: Denial of Service Attacks and Solutions
  214. Chapter 25: Computer Crime
  215. Chapter 26: Who Do You Trust?
  216. Appendix A: Unix Security Checklist
  217. Appendix B: Unix Processes
  218. Appendixes C, D, and E: Paper Sources, Electronic Sources, and Organizations
  219. B. Unix Processes
  220. About Processes
  221. Signals
  222. Controlling and Examining Processes
  223. Starting Up Unix and Logging In
  224. C. Paper Sources
  225. Unix Security References
  226. Other Computer References
  227. D. Electronic Resources
  228. Mailing Lists
  229. Web Sites
  230. Usenet Groups
  231. Software Resources
  232. E. Organizations
  233. Professional Organizations
  234. U.S. Government Organizations
  235. Emergency Response Organizations
  236. Index
  237. Index
  238. Index
  239. Index
  240. Index
  241. Index
  242. Index
  243. Index
  244. Index
  245. Index
  246. Index
  247. Index
  248. Index
  249. Index
  250. Index
  251. Index
  252. Index
  253. Index
  254. Index
  255. Index
  256. Index
  257. Index
  258. Index
  259. Index
  260. Index
  261. Index
  262. Index
  263. About the Authors
  264. Colophon
  265. Copyright

The Problem with Security Through Obscurity

We’d like to close this chapter on policy formation with a few words about knowledge. In traditional security, derived largely from military intelligence, there is the concept of “need to know.” Information is partitioned, and you are given only as much as you need to do your job. In environments where specific items of information are sensitive or where inferential security is a concern, this policy makes considerable sense. If three pieces of information together can form a damaging conclusion and no one has access to more than two, you can ensure confidentiality.

In a computer operations environment, applying the same need-to-know concept is usually not appropriate. This is especially true if you find yourself basing your security on the fact that something technical is unknown to your attackers. This concept can even hurt your security.

Consider an environment where management decides to keep the manuals away from the users to prevent them from learning about commands and options that might be used to crack the system. Under such circumstances, the managers might believe they have increased their security, but they probably have not. A determined attacker will find the same documentation elsewhere—from other users or from other sites. Extensive amounts of Unix documentation are as close as the nearest bookstore! Management cannot close down all possible avenues for learning about the system.

In the meantime, the local users are likely to make less efficient use of the machine because they are unable to view the documentation and learn about more efficient options. They are also likely to have a poorer attitude because the implicit message from management is “We don’t completely trust you to be a responsible user.” Furthermore, if someone does start abusing commands and features of the system, management may not have a pool of talent to recognize or deal with the problem. And if something should happen to the one or two users authorized to access the documentation, there is no one with the requisite experience or knowledge to step in or help out.

Keeping Secrets

Keeping bugs or features secret to protect them is also a poor approach to security. System developers often insert back doors in their programs to let them gain privileges without supplying passwords (see Chapter 19). Other times, system bugs with profound security implications are allowed to persist because management assumes that nobody knows of them. The problem with these approaches is that features and problems in the code have a tendency to be discovered by accident or by determined attackers. The fact that the bugs and features are kept secret means that they are unwatched, and probably unpatched. After being discovered, the existence of the problem will make all similar systems vulnerable to attack by the persons who discover the problem.

Keeping algorithms, such as a locally developed encryption algorithm, secret is also of questionable value. Unless you are an expert in cryptography, you most likely can’t analyze the strength of your algorithm. The result may be a mechanism that has a serious flaw in it. An algorithm that is kept secret isn’t scrutinized by others, and thus someone who does discover the hole may have free access to your data without your knowledge.

Likewise, keeping the source code of your operating system or application secret is no guarantee of security. Those who are determined to break into your system will occasionally find security holes, with or without source code.[28] But without the source code, users cannot carry out a systematic examination of a program for problems. Thus, there may be some small benefit to keeping the code hidden, but it shouldn’t be depended on.

The key is attitude. Defensive measures that are based primarily on secrecy lose their value if their secrecy is breached. Even worse, when maintaining secrecy restricts or prevents auditing and monitoring, it can be impossible to determine whether secrecy has been breached. You are better served by algorithms and mechanisms that are inherently strong, even if they’re known to an attacker. The very fact that you are using strong, known mechanisms may discourage an attacker and cause the idly curious to seek excitement elsewhere. Putting your money in a wall safe is better protection than depending on the fact that no one knows that you hide your money in a mayonnaise jar in your refrigerator.

Responsible Disclosure

Despite our objection to “security through obscurity,” we do not advocate that you widely publicize new security holes the moment that you find them. There is a difference between secrecy and prudence! If you discover a security hole in distributed or widely available software, you should quietly report it to the vendor as soon as possible. We also recommend that you report it to one of the FIRST teams (described in Appendix E). These organizations can take action to help vendors develop patches and see that they are distributed in an appropriate manner.

If you “go public” with a security hole, you endanger all of the people who are running that software but who don’t have the ability to apply fixes. In the Unix environment, many users are accustomed to having the source code available to make local modifications to correct flaws. Unfortunately, not everyone is so lucky, and many people have to wait weeks or months for updated software from their vendors. Some sites may not even be able to upgrade their software because they’re running a turn-key application, or one that has been certified in some way based on the current configuration. Other systems are being run by individuals who don’t have the necessary expertise to apply patches. Still others are no longer in production, or are at least out of maintenance. Always act responsibly. It may be preferable to circulate a patch without explaining or implying the underlying vulnerability than to give attackers details on how to break into unpatched systems.

We have seen many instances in which a well-intentioned person reported a significant security problem in a very public forum. Although the person’s intention was to elicit a rapid fix from the affected vendors, the result was a wave of break-ins to systems where the administrators did not have access to the same public forum, or were unable to apply a fix appropriate for their environment.

Posting details of the latest security vulnerability in your system to a mailing list if there is no patch available will not only endanger many other sites, it may also open you to civil action for damages if that flaw is used to break into those sites.[29] If you are concerned with your security, realize that you’re a part of a community. Seek to reinforce the security of everyone else in that community as well—and remember that you may need the assistance of others one day.



[28] Unless you’re developing the software by yourself on your own workstation, several people may have access to the source code, and, intentionally or accidentally, code gets leaked.

[29] Although we are unaware of any cases having been filed yet on these grounds, several lawyers have told us that they are waiting for their clients to request such an action. Several believe this to be a viable course of action.